to curtail and limit the power of debate; to confer, if necessary, upon the Speaker, or upon the bare majority of members present, authority to bring every debate summarily to a close, is something like overthrowing the monarchy, a thing not to be dreamt of by the wildest of innovators.  Plain men outside the walls of Parliament can assure our representatives, that the world would bear with infinite calmness the imposition of stringent restrictions on the overflow of Parliamentary eloquence.  If even the great debate on Home Rule had been finished say in a week, the outer world would have been well pleased; and measures such as the Government of Ireland Bill happily do not come before Parliament every year.  The more subtle evils arising in part at least from the presence of the Irish members must be met by more searching remedies.  Parnellite obstruction has revealed rather than caused the weakness of government by Parliament.  The experience, not of England only, but of other countries, shows the great difficulty of working our present party system of government in a representative assembly which is divided into more than two parties.  The essential difficulty lies in the immediate dependence of a modern ministry for its existence on every vote of the House of Commons.  If you see the difficulty, you can also see various means by which it may be removed.  In more than one country, and notably in the United States and in Switzerland—­states, be it remarked, in which popular government flourishes—­the executive, though in the long run amenable to the voice of the people, and though in Switzerland actually appointed by the legislature, is not like an English Cabinet dependent on the fluctuating will of a legislative assembly.  If it were necessary to choose between modifications in the relation of the executive to Parliament, and the repeal of the Act of Union, most Englishmen would think that to increase the independence of the executive—­a change probably desirable in itself—­was a less evil than a disruption of the United Kingdom, which not only is in itself a gigantic evil, but may well lead to others.  A modification, however, in the practice would, for the moment at least, save the real principles of Parliamentary government.  Were it once understood that a Ministry would not retire from office except in consequence of a direct vote of want of confidence in the House of Commons, the political power of the Parnellite, or of any other minority, would be greatly diminished.  Meanwhile, members of Parliament may be reminded that it is on them that the duty lies of removing the obstacles which from time to time impede the working of Parliamentary machinery, and that the existence of temptation to political turpitude is not an admitted excuse for yielding to it.  In one way or another a majority of 584 members must, if they choose, be able to make head against the minority of 86.  Their failure already excites astonishment; the time is coming when it will excite contempt.  The English people, moreover, have the remedy in their own hands.  By giving to either of the great parties an absolute majority they can terminate all the inconveniences threatened by Parnellite obstruction.  The remedy is in their hands, and recent experience suggests that they will not be slow to use it.