and latterly with great success, to win over English
opinion to their cause, and it undermines the whole
position occupied by Mr. Gladstone and his English
followers. They assume with undeniable truth that
the English people will not at the present moment,
except under compulsion, acquiesce in Irish independence;
they further assume, and must from the nature of the
case assume, that Home Rule under one shape or another
presents a fair prospect at least of advantages not
derivable from the maintenance of the Union, and is
at the very worst so much less injurious to British
interests than would be separation from Ireland, as
to offer to England a reasonable compromise between
the just claims of Englishmen to secure the prosperity
of Great Britain and the greatness of the British
Empire, and the legitimate desire of Irishmen for
national independence. If the proposition which
it is my object to maintain turn out to be sound,
all these assumptions fall to the ground, together
with a host of fallacies for which these assumptions
form the necessary basis. The principle, in short,
which it is my object to enforce—that Home
Rule in Ireland is more dangerous to England than
Irish independence—lies at the bottom of
all the rational opposition made by Unionists to the
creation of an Irish Parliament, and, together with
the arguments by which the principle is maintained,
and the conclusions to which it leads, forms the true
and just and reasonable case of England against Home
Rule.
[Sidenote: Possible objections to method.]
The whole spirit and method of my argument is open
to at least three plausible objections, which deserve
examination, both because if left unnoticed they are
certain to occur to and perplex any intelligent reader,
and because their removal brings into relief the strength
of my line of reasoning.
[Sidenote: 1. Too abstract.]
First objection.—To deal with a
burning controversy in the abstract and logical manner
suitable to the discussion of the problems of jurisprudence
savours, it may be objected, of theoretic, academic,
or pedantic disquisition more fit for a University
class-room than for the living world of contemporary
politics.
The force of this criticism does not admit of denial.
My method of treating the question of Home Rule is
necessarily lifeless when compared with the vehement
rhetoric or heated eloquence which characterises public
or parliamentary discussion; it is also true that
the argumentative treatment of matters affecting actual
life always bears about it a certain air of unreality.