The English Colonial system on the other hand, though far less elaborate than any form of Federalism, does, as a matter of fact, reduce within very narrow limits the chances of collision between England and her colonies.  The system, however, succeeds, not because it is a model of constructive art, but because it attempts very little, and can, owing to favourable circumstances, leave to nominal dependencies something little short of complete self-government.  Where collisions do arise they are disposed of by the habit of the Imperial Government always to give way.

The Gladstonian Constitution is, as we have already pointed out, a combination between Federalism and Colonialism; it may possess some of the merits, but it much more certainly displays some of the demerits of each system.  From Federalism is borrowed the idea of leaving the settlement of constitutional questions to a Court.  But the conception is spoilt in the borrowing.  All the difficulties which under a Federal system beset the enforcement of judgments pronounced by a Federal Court affect in an aggravated form the attempt to enforce in Ireland judgments affecting the validity of Irish Acts, which judgments are pronounced by a Committee of the English Privy Council sitting in England.  The Privy Council, moreover, while it has every weakness of the Supreme Court of America, has more than one special weakness of its own.  It lacks moral authority, for it is an English Court sitting in England and representing English opinion; it lacks jurisdiction, because while it can pronounce on the validity of Irish, it cannot pronounce on the validity of British Acts of Parliament; it does not possess a strictly judicial character, because it is not only a Court called upon to give judgments, but is also an administrative body called upon to deliver opinions upon the validity of Irish Bills and of Irish Acts.  Hence its decrees come into direct collision with the proposals or enactments of the Irish Parliament, and the Privy Council is made to appear not as a body of Judges deciding cases between man and man, but as a body of officials whose duty it is to oppose any unconstitutional action on the part of the Irish Parliament.  From Federalism again is borrowed the contribution by Ireland towards meeting the expenses of the Empire.  But imposts which under a Federal system are a tax towards the payment of common expenditure are under the Gladstonian Constitution a tribute to a foreign power.  From the Federal system again is taken that restriction of legislative authority which hardly affects Parliaments such as that of Victoria, and which under any circumstances is a source of irritation.  From the Colonial system, on the other hand, is derived the theoretical supremacy of the British Parliament, the right of veto, and the fatal dependence of the Irish executive on every vote of the Irish legislature.  From the colonies we therefore bring to Ireland sources of dispute, of friction, and of irritation, which