that the country shall defend herself, and they discover that they cannot raise even a body of volunteers; they wish to try the plan of concurrent endowment, and they are thwarted by the article of the Constitution prohibiting the endowment of religion.  These restrictions are the more annoying because none of them are imposed upon the Colonies.  Irishmen will further discover that great achievements of constructive legislation require for their success the command of large pecuniary resources, and that exemption from British control involves the withdrawal of all assistance from the British Treasury.

[Sidenote:  Constitution will cause friction.]

The Constitution will produce irritation and friction.

Every scheme for uniting into a political whole States which are intended to retain, even when connected together, a certain amount of independence, aims at minimising the opportunities for constitutional collision, or for friction between the different States which are connected together, and also between any State and the Central power.  If we compare the mode in which this end is attained, either under the Federal system or under the Colonial system, with the arrangements of the Gladstonian Constitution, we shall easily see how little its authors have attended to the necessity for avoiding occasions of constitutional friction.

Where Federalism, as in America, appears in its best form, the skill with which opportunities for collision or friction have been minimised is almost above praise.  The Federal or Central power is so constructed as to represent the whole nation; its authority cannot by any misrepresentation be identified with the power of one State more than another.  The Federal Government acts through its own officers, is represented by its own Judiciary, and levies its own taxes without recourse to State authorities.  Every device which could be thought of has been taken to make it unnecessary for the National Government to come into direct collision with any State.  It deals in general with the individual citizens of the United States; it does not deal with the particular States.  The result is that on the one hand, whatever may be said against the taxes imposed by Congress, they cannot by any stretch of imagination be looked upon as tribute paid by one State to another, say by Massachusetts to New York, or by New York to Massachusetts.  It is again unnecessary for the Federal Government to issue commands to a State.  There is, therefore, little opportunity for a contest between a State and the National Executive.  Whoever wishes to understand the elaborate devices necessary to make Federalism work smoothly should compare the clumsiness of the arrangements by which the Swiss Confederacy has at times been compelled to enforce obedience of the Cantons to the will of the Confederation, with the ingenuity of the methods by which the Federal authorities of the United States exert their authority over American citizens.