the Constitution by the use of force.  The employment of power becomes the more not the less odious because it is allied, or seems to be allied, with fraud.  The miserable tale of the transactions which carried the Treaty of Union teaches at least one indisputable lesson—­the due observance of legal formalities will not induce a people to pardon what they deem to be acts of tyranny, made all the more hateful by their combination with deceit.  For the British Parliament to renounce the exercise whilst retaining the name of sovereignty is the very course by which to run a great risk of damaging the character without any certainty of increasing the power of Parliament.

The plain answer then to the enquiry on which we have been engaged is this:—­

Under the Gladstonian Constitution, as foreshadowed in the Government of Ireland Bill, the sovereignty of the British Parliament is legally rendered doubtful, and is morally reduced to nothing.

[Sidenote:  Does Constitution secure justice?]

2nd Question.—­Does the Gladstonian Constitution secure justice?

The justice which the Constitution ought to secure is twofold—­justice to Great Britain, and justice to all classes, including minorities, of Irishmen.

The just claims of Great Britain may roughly be summed up under the one claim, that Ireland should contribute her fair share to Imperial expenditure.

The Gladstonian Constitution, nominally at least, makes fair provision that this claim should be satisfied.  But any one who looks into the matter with care will find reason to think that as regards the exaction of payments from Ireland, which are already known by the hateful name of “tribute,” Great Britain will find herself involved in this dilemma.  Either she must surrender the tribute, or else surrender all hope of attaining the main object for the sake of which it is proposed to grant Home Rule to Ireland.  If the tribute is exacted, we may be sure that it will have to be exacted in the long run by British officials supported by a British army.  Laws, we are told, which are otherwise just are hated in Ireland because they bear a foreign aspect, and come before the Irish people in a foreign garb.  If this assertion be not true, then the whole case for Home Rule falls to the ground.  If this assertion possess even partial truth, then it applies with far greater force to tribute than to law.  It is almost an absurdity to suppose that people who hate good laws because they may be termed English will not detest a heavy tax which not only may be called, but in reality is, a tribute to England.  It is well to remember that a “publican” was a tax-gatherer, and that Roman publicans were far more hated than Roman Judges or Roman law.  If England gives Ireland semi-independence, and at the same time makes Ireland pay tribute, all the conciliatory effects of Home Rule will be lost.  If Home Rule is to have even a bare chance of producing in Ireland the contentment