as servants of conscious perception or of reflex action, and the development of the higher sense-organs, especially of the eyes, has called forth a higher development of the brain.  The brain continually develops both through constant exercise and through natural selection.  Through the higher and more delicate sense-organs it perceives a continually wider range of more subtile elements in its environment.  And the higher the sense-organ the more directly and purely does it minister to consciousness.  The eye, when capable of forming an image, is almost never concerned in a purely reflex action.

From the constant recurrence of perceptions and experiences in a constant order the animal begins to associate these, and when he has perceived the one to expect the other.  Out of this grows, in time, inference and understanding.  The mind is beginning to turn its attention not merely to objects and qualities, but to perceive relations.  And thus it has taken the first step toward the perception of abstract truth.  And if it has the aesthetic perception and can perceive beauty, we have every reason to believe that the same faculty will one day perceive truth and right.  But on the purely animal plane of existence these powers could be of but little service, and we can expect to find them developed only very slightly and under peculiar surroundings.  And in this connection it is interesting to notice the great results of man’s training and education in the dog.  For the wolf and the jackal, the dog’s nearest relatives, if not his actual ancestors, are not especially intelligent mammals.  Compared with them the dog is a sage and a saint.

The earliest form of action is the reflex.  This is independent of both consciousness and will.  The only conscious voluntary action of the animal is limited mainly or entirely to the recognition and attainment of food.  The motive for the exertion of the will is the appetite, and the will is the slave or mouthpiece of the body.  Far higher than this is the stage of instinct.  Here the animal is conscious of its actions and new motives begin to appear.  But the animal is guided by tendencies inherited from its ancestors.  The will has, so to speak, advisory power; it is by no means supreme.  But with a wider and deeper knowledge of its environment, with the memory of past experiences, carried by the higher locomotive powers into new surroundings, brought face to face with new emergencies outside of the range of its old instincts, it is compelled to try some experiments of its own.  It begins to modify these instincts, and in time altogether does away with many of them.  It has risen a little above its old abject slavery to the appetites, it is slowly throwing off the bondage to heredity.  New emotions or motives have arisen appealing directly to the individual will.  The heir has been long enough under guardians and regents, it assumes the government and can rightly say, “L’etat, c’est moi.”