Concerning the origin of instincts there are several theories.  Some instincts would seem to be the result of non-intelligent, perhaps unconscious, habits becoming fixed by heredity and improved by natural selection; others would appear to be modifications of actions originally due to intelligence.  Instinct is therefore characterized by consciousness of the stimulus to act, of the means and end, without the knowledge of the exact adaptation of means to end.  It is hereditary and characterizes species or large groups.

3.  Intelligent Action.  You come in cold and sit down before an open fire.  You push the brands together to make the fire burn.  Applying once more the criterion of consciousness to this action we notice that you are conscious of the stimulus to act, of the steps of the action, and of the end to be attained, exactly as in instinctive action.  But finally, and this is the essential characteristic of intelligent action, you are aware to a certain extent of the fitness of the means to the attainment of the end.  This piece of knowledge you had to acquire for yourself.  Erasmus Darwin defined a fool as a man who had never tried an experiment.  Experience and observation, not heredity, are the sources of intelligence.  Intelligence is power to think, and a man may be very learned—­for do we not have learned pigs?—­and yet have very little real intelligence.  Hence this is possessed by different individuals in very varying degrees.

We may now briefly compare these three kinds of nervous action.

Reflex action is involuntary and unconscious.  The actor may, and usually does, become conscious of the action after it has been commenced or completed, but this is not at all necessary or universal.

Instinctive action is to a certain extent voluntary and conscious.  The actor is conscious of the stimulus, the means and mode, and the end or purpose of the action.  Of the exact fitness or adaptation of the means to the end the actor is unconscious.

Intelligent action is conscious and voluntary.  The actor is conscious of the stimulus to act, of the means and mode, and to a certain extent of the adaptation of the means to the end.  This last item of knowledge, lacking in instinctive action, is acquired by experience or observation.

Reflex action may be regarded as a comparatively mechanical, though often very complex, process; the reflex ganglia appear to be hardly more than switch-boards.  There is stimulus of the sense-organs, and thus what Mr. Romanes has called “unfelt sensation,” unfelt as far as the completion of the action is concerned.  But in instinct the sensation no longer remains unfelt; perception is necessary, consciousness plays a part.  And this consciousness is a vastly more subtle element, differing as much apparently from the vibration of brain, or nervous, molecules as the Geni from the rubbing of Aladdin’s lamp, to borrow an illustration.