clarity the way in which the idea of pleasure is related
at once to individual satisfaction and to that sympathy
for others which is one of the roots of social existence.
He points out the need for happiness in work.
“The mind,” he writes, “acquires
new vigor, enlarges its powers and faculties, and by
an assiduity in honest industry both satisfies its
own appetites and prevents growth of unnatural ones”;
though, like his predecessor, Francis Hutcheson, he
overemphasizes the delights opened by civilization
to the humbler class of men. He gives large space
in his discussion to the power of will; and, indeed,
one of the main advantages he ascribed to government
was the compulsion it puts upon us to allow the categories
of time and space a part in our calculations.
He does not, being in his own life entirely free from
avarice, regard the appetite for riches as man’s
main motive to existence; though no one was more urgent
in his insistence that “the avidity of acquiring
goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest
friends is ... destructive of society” unless
balanced by considerations of justice. And what
he therein intended may be gathered from the liberal
notions of equality he manifested. “Every
person,” he wrote in a famous passage, “if
possible ought to enjoy the fruits of his labor in
a full possession of all the necessaries, and many
of the conveniences of life. No one can doubt
but such an equality is most suitable to human nature,
and diminishes much less the happiness of the rich
than it adds to that of the poor.” It is
clear that we have moved far from the narrow confines
of the old political arithmetic. The theory of
utility enables Hume to see the scope of economics—the
word itself he did not know—in a more generous
perspective than at any previous time. It would
be too much to say that his grasp of its psychological
foundation enabled him entirely to move from the limitations
of the older concept of a national prosperity expressed
only in terms of bullion to the view of economics
as a social science. But at least he saw that
economics is rooted in the nature of men and therein
he had the secret of its true understanding.
The
Wealth of Nations would less easily have made
its way had not the insight of Hume prepared the road
for its reception.
What, then, and in general, is his place in the history
of political thought? Clearly enough, he is not
the founder of a system; his work is rather a series
of pregnant hints than a consecutive account of political
facts. Nor must we belittle the debt he owes to
his predecessors. Much, certainly, he owed to
Locke, and the full radiance of the Scottish enlightenment
emerges into the day with his teaching. Francis
Hutcheson gave him no small inspiration; and Hutcheson
means that he was indebted to Shaftesbury. Indeed,
there is much of the sturdy commonsense of the Scottish
school about him, particularly perhaps in that interweaving
of ethics, politics and economics, which is characteristic