his time upon the balance of power.  Above all, it is striking to see his helplessness before the problem of national character.  Mainly he ascribes it to the form of government, and that in turn to chance.  Even the friend of Montesquieu can see no significance in race or climate.  The idea, in fact, of evolution is entirely absent from his political speculation.  Political life, like human life, ends in death; and the problem is to make our egress as comfortable as we can, for the prime evil is disturbance.  It is difficult not to feel that there is almost a physical basis in his own disease for this love of quiet.  The man who put indolence among the primary motives of human happiness was not likely to view novel theories with unruffled temper.

Hume has an eminent place among economists, and for one to whom the study of such phenomena was but a casual inquiry, it is marvelous how much he saw.  He is free from the crude errors of mercantilism; and twenty years before Adam Smith hopes, “as a British subject,” for the prosperity of other countries.  “Free communication and exchange” seems to him an ordinance of nature; and he heaps contempt upon those “numberless bars, obstructions and imposts which all nations of Europe, and none more than England, have put upon trade.”  Specie he places in its true light as merely a medium of exchange.  The supposed antagonism between commerce and agriculture he disposes of in a half-dozen effective sentences.  He sees the place of time and distance in the discussion of economic want.  He sees the value of a general level of economic equality, even while he is sceptical of its attainment.  He insists upon the economic value of high wages, though he somewhat belittles the importance of wealth in the achievement of happiness.  Before Bentham, who on this point converted Adam Smith, he knew that the rate of interest depends upon the supply of and demand for loans.  He insists that commerce demands a free government for its progress, pointing out, doubtless from his abundant French experience, that an absolute government gives to the commercial class an insufficient status of honor.  He pointed out, doubtless with France again in his mind, the evils of an arbitrary system of taxation.  “They are commonly converted,” he says with unwonted severity, “into punishments on industry; and also, by their unavoidable inequality, are more grievous, than by the real burden which they impose.”  And he emphasizes his belief that the best taxes are those which, like taxes upon luxury, press least upon the poor.

Such insight is extraordinary enough in the pre-Adamite epoch; but even more remarkable are his psychological foundations.  The wealth of the State, he says, is the labor of its subjects, and they work because the wants of man are not a stated sum, but “multiply every moment upon him.”  The desire for wealth comes from the idea of pleasure; and in the Treatise on Human Nature he discusses with superb