But there is a third contingency I have nowhere seen discussed or hinted at, and yet it is at least as likely as No. 1, and far more probable than No. 2—­for I do not think that the annexation of Ireland by a European power is internationally possible, however decisive might be the overthrow of England.  It is admitted (and it is upon this hypothesis that the discussion is proceeding) that Great Britain might be defeated by Germany, and that the British fleet might be broken and an enemy’s sword might transfix England.  Such an overthrow would be of enormous import to Europe and to the whole world.  The trident would have changed hands, for the defeat of England could only be brought about by the destruction of her sea supremacy.  Unless help came from without, a blockaded Britain would be more at the mercy of the victor than France was after Sedan and Paris.  It would lie with the victor to see that the conditions of peace he imposed were such as, while ensuring to him the objects for which he had fought, would be the least likely conditions to provoke external intervention or a combination of alarmed world interests.  Now, putting aside lesser consideration, the chief end Germany would have in a war with England would be to ensure her own free future on the seas.  For with that assured and guaranteed by a victory over England, all else that she seeks must in the end be hers.  To annex resisting British colonies would be in itself an impossible task—­physically a much more impossible task than to annex Ireland.

To annex Ireland would be, as a military measure, once command of the seas was gained, a comparatively easy task.  No practical resistance to one German army corps even could be offered by any force Ireland contains, or could of herself, put into the field.  No arsenal or means of manufacturing arms exists.  The population has been disarmed for a century, and by bitter experience has been driven to regard the use of arms as a criminal offence.  Patriotism has been treated as felony.  Volunteers and Territorials are not for Ireland.  To expect that a disarmed and demoralized population who have been sedulously batoned into a state of physical and moral dejection, should develop military virtues in face of a disciplined army is to attribute to Irishmen the very qualities their critics unite in denying them.  “The Irishman fights well everywhere except in Ireland,” has passed into a commonplace:  and since every effort of government has been directed to ensuring the abiding application of the sneer, Englishmen would find, in the end, the emasculating success of their rule completely justified in the physical submission of Ireland to the new force that held her down.  With Great Britain cut off and the Irish Sea held by German squadrons, no power from within could maintain any effective resistance to a German occupation of Dublin and a military administration of the island.  To convert that into permanent administration could not be opposed from within, and with Great Britain