That an Ireland severed by force of arms from the British Empire and annexed to the German Empire would be ill-governed by her new masters is inconceivable.  On the contrary, the ablest brains in Germany, scientific, commercial, and financial, no less than military and strategic, would be devoted to the great task of making sure the conquest not only of an island but of the intelligence of a not unintelligent people, and by wisely developing so priceless a possession to reconcile its inhabitants through growing prosperity and an excellent administration, to so great a change in their political environment.  Can it be said that England, even in her most lucid intervals, has brought to the Government of Ireland her best efforts, her most capable men, or her highest purpose?  The answer may be given by Li Hung Chang, whose diary we have so lately read.  Recording his interview with Mr. Gladstone, the Chinese statesman says:  “He spoke about ...  Ireland; and I was certain that he hoped to see that unhappy country governed better before he died.  ’They have given their best to England,’ he said, ’and in return have been given only England’s worst.’” It is certain that Germany, once in possession of Ireland, would assuredly not give to that country only Germany’s worst.

In a score of ways Ireland would stand to gain from the change of direction, of purpose, of intention, and, I will add, of inspiration and capacity in her newly-imposed rulers.

Whether she liked them or not, at the outset, would be beside the question.  In this they would differ but little from those she had so long and wearily had measure of, and if they brought to their new task a new spirit and a new intellectual equipment Irishmen would not be slow to realize that if they themselves were never to rule their own country, they had, at least, found in their new masters something more than emigration agents.

Moreover, to Germany there would be no “Irish question,” no “haggard and haunting problem” to palsy her brain and miscredit her hand with its old tags and jibes and sordid impulses to deny the obvious.

To Germany there would be only an English question.  To prevent that from ever again imperilling her world future would be the first purpose of German overseas statesmanship.  And it is clear that a wise and capable Irish Administration, designed to build up and strengthen from within and not to belittle and exploit from without, would be the sure and certain purpose of a victorious Germany.

I have now outlined the two possible dispositions of Ireland that up to this British opinion admits as conceivable in die improbable event of a British defeat by Germany.  Only these two contingencies are ever admitted.  First that Ireland, sharing the common disaster, must endure with her defeated partner all the evils that a great overthrow must inflict upon the United Kingdom.  Second, that Ireland, if Great Britain should be completely defeated, might conceivably be “taken” or annexed by the victor and held as a conquered territory, and in this guise would bitterly regret the days of her union with Great Britain.  I have sought to show, in answer to the latter argument, that were annexation by the victor indeed to follow a British defeat Ireland might very conceivably find the changed circumstances greatly to her advantage.