him who now addresses you.  I do but quote from one of those speeches when I declare that “I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists.  I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.”  Those who nominated and elected me did so with full knowledge that I had made this and many similar declarations, and had never recanted them.  And, more than this, they placed in the platform for my acceptance, and as a law to themselves and to me, the clear and emphatic resolution which I now read:—­

“Resolved, That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States, and especially the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend, and we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any State or Territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes.”

I now reiterate these sentiments; and, in doing so, I only press upon the public attention the most conclusive evidence of which the case is susceptible, that the property, peace, and security of no section are to be in any wise endangered by the now incoming administration.  I add, too, that all the protection which, consistently with the Constitution and the laws, can be given, will be cheerfully given to all the States when lawfully demanded, for whatever cause—­as cheerfully to one section as to another.

There is much controversy about the delivering up of fugitives from service or labour.  The clause I now read is as plainly written in the Constitution as any other of its provisions:—­

“No person held to service or labour in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein be discharged from such service or labour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labour may be due.”

It is scarcely questioned that this provision was intended by those who made it for the reclaiming of what we call fugitive slaves; and the intention of the lawgiver is the law.  All members of Congress swear their support to the whole Constitution—­to this provision as much as to any other.  To the proposition, then, that slaves whose cases come within the terms of this clause “shall be delivered up,” their oaths are unanimous.  Now, if they would make the effort in good temper, could they not with nearly equal unanimity frame and pass a law by means of which to keep good that unanimous oath?

There is some difference of opinion whether this clause should be enforced by national or by State authority; but surely that difference is not a very material one.  If the slave is to be surrendered, it can be of but little consequence to him or to others by which authority it is done.  And should any one in any case be content that his oath shall go unkept on a merely unsubstantial controversy as to how it shall be kept?