[Footnote 77:  J.W.  Headlam, Bismarck, p. 367.]

Such in its main outlines is the new Constitution of Germany.  On the whole, it has worked well.  That it has fulfilled all the expectations aroused in that year of triumph and jubilation will surprise no one who knows that absolute and lasting success is attained only in Utopias, never in practical politics.  In truth, the suddenness with which German unity was finally achieved was in itself a danger.

The English reader will perhaps find it hard to realise this until he remembers that the whole course of recorded history shows us the Germans politically disunited, or for the most part engaged in fratricidal strifes.  When they first came within the ken of the historians of Ancient Rome, they were a set of warring tribes who banded together only under the pressure of overwhelming danger; and such was to be their fate for well-nigh two thousand years.  Their union under the vigorous rule of the great Frankish chief whom the French call Charlemagne, was at best nominal and partial.  The Holy Roman Empire, which he founded in the year 800 by a mystically vague compact with the Pope, was never a close bond of union, even in his stern and able hands.  Under his weak successors that imposing league rarely promoted peace among its peoples, while the splendour of its chief elective dignity not seldom conduced to war.  Next, feudalism came in as a strong political solvent, and thus for centuries Germany crumbled and mouldered away, until disunion seemed to be the fate of her richest lands, and particularism became a rooted instinct of her princes, burghers, and peasants.  Then again South was arrayed against North during and long after the time of the Reformation; when the strife of creeds was stayed, the rivalry of the Houses of Hapsburg and Hohenzollern added another cause of hatred.

As a matter of fact, it was reserved for the two Napoleons, uncle and nephew, to force those divided peoples to comradeship in arms.  The close of the campaign of 1813 and that of 1814 saw North and South, Prussians and Austrians, for the first time fighting heartily shoulder to shoulder in a great war—­for that of 1792-94 had only served to show their rooted suspicion and inner hostility.  Owing to reasons that cannot be stated here, the peace of 1814-15 led up to no effective union:  it even perpetuated the old dualism of interests.  But once more the hostility of France under a Napoleon strengthened the impulse to German consolidation, and on this occasion there was at hand a man who had carefully prepared the way for an abiding form of political union; his diplomatic campaign of the last seven years had secured Russia’s friendship and consequently Austria’s reluctant neutrality; as for the dislike of the Southern States to unite with the North, that feeling waned for a few weeks amidst the enthusiasm caused by the German triumphs.  The opportunity was unexampled:  it had not occurred even in 1814; it might never occur again; and it was certain to pass away when the war fever passed by.  How wise, then, to strike while the iron was hot!  The smaller details of the welding process were infinitely less important than the welding itself.