A sharp difference of opinion had arisen between Bismarck and Moltke on this question, and the Emperor Wilhelm intervened in favour of Moltke.  That decided the question of Metz against Thiers despite his threat that this might lead to a renewal of war.  For Belfort, however, the French statesman made a supreme effort.  That fortress holds a most important position.  Strong in itself, it stands as sentinel guarding the gap of nearly level ground between the spurs of the Vosges and those of the Jura.  If that virgin stronghold were handed over to Germany, she would easily be able to pour her legions down the valley of the Doubs and dominate the rich districts of Burgundy and the Lyonnais.  Besides, military honour required France to keep a fortress that had kept the tricolour flying.  Metz the Germans held, and it was impossible to turn them out.  Obviously the case of Belfort was on a different footing.  In his conference of February 24, Thiers at last defied Bismarck in these words:  “No; I will never yield Belfort and Metz in the same breath.  You wish to ruin France in her finances, in her frontiers.  Well!  Take her.  Conduct her administration, collect her revenues, and you will have to govern her in the face of Europe—­if Europe permits[60].”

[Footnote 60:  G. Hanotaux, Contemporary France, vol i. p. 124 (Eng. edit.).  This work is the most detailed and authoritative that has yet appeared on these topics.  See, too, M. Samuel Denis’ work, Histoire Contemporaine.]

Probably this defiance had less weight with the Iron Chancellor than his conviction, noticed above, that to bring two entirely French towns within the German Empire would prove a source of weakness; beside which his own motto, Beati possidentes, told with effect in the case of Belfort.  That stronghold was accordingly saved for France.  Thiers also obtained a reduction of a milliard from the impossible sum of six milliards first named for the war indemnity due to Germany; in this matter Jules Favre states that British mediation had been of some avail.  If so, it partly accounts for the hatred of England which Bismarck displayed in his later years.  The Preliminaries of Peace were signed at Versailles on February 26.

One other matter remained.  The Germans insisted that, if Belfort remained to France, part of their army should enter Paris.  In vain did Thiers and Jules Favre point out the irritation that this would cause and the possible ensuing danger.  The German Emperor and his Staff made it a point of honour, and 30,000 of their troops accordingly marched in and occupied for a brief space the district of the Champs Elysees.  The terms of peace were finally ratified in the Treaty of Frankfurt (May 10, 1871), whereby France ceded Alsace and part of Lorraine, with a population of some 1,600,000 souls, and underwent the other losses noted above.  Last but not least was the burden of supporting the German army of occupation that kept