of August; it is also certain that Bismarck duped him under the pretence that, on certain conditions to be arranged with the Empress Eugenie, his army might be kept intact for the sake of re-establishing the Empire[56].  The whole scheme was merely a device to gain time and keep Bazaine idle, and the German Chancellor succeeded here as at all points in his great game.  On October 27, then, 6000 officers, 173,000 rank and file, were constrained by famine to surrender, along with 541 field-pieces and 800 siege guns.

[Footnote 56:  Bazaine gives the details from his point of view in his Episodes de la Guerre de 1870 et le Blocus de Metz (Madrid, 1883).  One of the go-betweens was a man Regnier, who pretended to come from the Empress Eugenie, then at Hastings; but Bismarck seems to have distrusted him and to have dismissed him curtly.  The adventuress, Mme. Humbert, recently claimed that she had her “millions” from this Regnier.  A sharp criticism on Bazaine’s conduct at Metz is given in a pamphlet, Reponse au Rapport sommaire sur les Operations de l’Armee du Rhin, by one of his Staff Officers.  See, too, M. Samuel Denis in his recent work, Histoire Contemporaine (de France).]

This capitulation, the greatest recorded in the history of civilised nations, dealt a death-blow to the hopes of France.  Strassburg had hoisted the white flag a month earlier; and the besiegers of these fortresses were free to march westwards and overwhelm the new levies.  After gaining a success at Coulmiers, near Orleans (Nov. 9), the French were speedily driven down the valley of the Loire and thence as far west as Le Mans.  In the North, at St. Quentin, the Germans were equally successful, as also in Burgundy against that once effective free-lance, Garibaldi, who came with his sons to fight for the Republic.  The last effort was made by Bourbaki and a large but ill-compacted army against the enemy’s communications in Alsace.  By a speedy concentration the Germans at Hericourt, near Belfort, defeated this daring move (imposed by the Government of National Defence on Bourbaki against his better judgment), and compelled him and his hard-pressed followers to pass over into Switzerland (January 30, 1871).

Meanwhile Paris had already surrendered.  During 130 days, and that too in a winter of unusual severity, the great city had held out with a courage that neither defeats, schisms, dearth of food, nor the bombardment directed against its southern quarters could overcome.  Towards the close of January famine stared the defenders in the face, and on the 28th an armistice was concluded, which put an end to the war except in the neighbourhood of Belfort.  That exception was due to the determination of the Germans to press Bourbaki hard, while the French negotiators were not aware of his plight.  The garrison of Paris, except 12,000 men charged with the duty of keeping order, surrendered; the forts were placed in the besiegers’ hands.  When that was done the city was to be revictualled and thereafter pay a war contribution of 200,000,000 francs (L8,000,000).  A National Assembly was to be freely elected and meet at Bordeaux to discuss the question of peace.  The National Guards retained their arms, Favre maintaining that it would be impossible to disarm them; for this mistaken weakness he afterwards expressed his profound sorrow[57].