As dusk fell over the scene of carnage the French right fell back in some disorder, even from part of Amanvillers.  Farther south, they held their ground.  On the whole they had dealt to their foes a loss of 20,159 men, or nearly a tenth of their total.  Of the French forces engaged, some 150,000 in number, 7853 were killed and wounded, and 4419 were taken prisoners.  The disproportion in the losses shows the toughness of the French defence and the (in part) unskilful character of the German attack.  On this latter point the recently published Journals of Field-Marshal Count von Blumenthal supply some piquant details.  He describes the indignation of King William at the wastefulness of the German tactics at Gravelotte:  “He complained bitterly that the officers of the higher grades appeared to have forgotten all that had been so carefully taught them at manoeuvres, and had apparently all lost their heads.”  The same authority supplies what may be in part an explanation of this in his comment, written shortly before Gravelotte, that he believed there might not be another battle in the whole war—­a remark which savours of presumption and folly.  Gravelotte, therefore, cannot be considered as wholly creditable to the victors.  Still, the result was that some 180,000 French troops were shut up within the outworks of Metz[42].

[Footnote 42:  For fuller details of these battles the student should consult the two great works on the subject—­the Staff Histories of the war, issued by the French and German General Staffs; Bazaine, L’Armee du Rhin, and Episodes de la Guerre; General Blumenthal’s Journals; Aus drei Kriegen, by Gen. von Lignitz; Maurice, The Franco-German War; Hooper, The Campaign of Sedan; the War Correspondence of the Times and the Daily News, published in book form.]

NOTE THE SECOND EDITION

With reference to M. Ollivier’s statement (quoted on p. 55) that he entered on war with a light heart, it should be added that he has since explained his meaning to have been that the cause of France was just, that of Prussia unjust.

CHAPTER III

SEDAN

“Nothing is more rash and contrary to the principles of war than to make a flank-march before an army in position, especially when this army occupies heights before which it is necessary to defile.”—­NAPOLEON I.

The success of the German operations to the south and west of Metz virtually decided the whole of the campaign.  The Germans could now draw on their vast reserves ever coming on from the Rhine, throw an iron ring around that fortress, and thereby deprive France of her only great force of regular troops.  The throwing up of field-works and barricades went on with such speed that the blockading forces were able in a few days to detach a strong column towards Chalons-sur-Marne in order to help the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia.  That army in the meantime was in pursuit of MacMahon by way of Nancy, and strained every nerve so as to be able to strike at the southern railway lines out of Paris.  It was, however, diverted to the north-west by events soon to be described.