The mad charge drove deep into the French array about Rezonville, and gave their leaders pause in the belief that it was but the first of a series of systematic attacks on the French left.  System rather than dash was supposed to characterise German tactics; and the daring of their enemies for once made the French too methodical.  Bazaine scarcely brought the 3rd corps and the Guard into action at all, but kept them in reserve.  As the afternoon sun waned, the whole weight of the German 10th corps was thrown into the fight about Vionville, and the vanguards of the 8th and 9th came up from Gorze to threaten the French left.  Fearing that he might be cut off from Metz on the south—­a fear which had unaccountably haunted him all the day—­Bazaine continued to feed that part of his lines; and thus Alvensleben was able to hold the positions near the southern road to Verdun, which he had seized in the morning.  The day closed with a great cavalry combat on the German left wing in which the French had to give way.  Darkness alone put an end to the deadly strife.  Little more than two German corps had sufficed to stay the march of an army which potentially numbered in all more than 170,000 men.

On both sides the losses were enormous, namely, some 16,000 killed and wounded.  No cannon, standards, or prisoners were taken; but on that day the army of Prince Frederick Charles practically captured the whole of Bazaine’s army.  The statement may seem overdrawn, but it is none the less true.  The advance of other German troops on that night made Bazaine’s escape from Metz far more difficult than before, and very early on the morrow he drew back his lines through Gravelotte to a strong position nearer Metz.  Thus, a battle, which in a tactical sense seemed to be inconclusive, became, when viewed in the light of strategy, the most decisive of the war.  Had Bazaine used even the forces which he had in the field ready to hand he must have overborne Alvensleben; and the arrival of 170,000 good troops at Verdun or Chalons would have changed the whole course of the war.  The campaign would probably have followed the course of the many campaigns waged in the valleys of the Meuse and Marne; and Metz, held by a garrison of suitable size, might have defied the efforts of a large besieging army for fully six months.  These conjectures are not fanciful.  The duration of the food supply of a garrison cut off from the outside world varies inversely with the size of that garrison.  The experiences of armies invading and defending the East of France also show with general accuracy what might have been expected if the rules of sound strategy had been observed.  It was the actual course of events which transcended experience and set all probabilities at defiance.