[Footnote 554:  Russian Orange Book, Nos. 25, 40, 43, 58.]

[Footnote 555:  Austrian “Rotbuch,” Nos. 28, 31, 44; Brit.  White Paper, Nos. 91-97, 161. J’accuse (III.  A) goes too far in accusing Austria of consciously provoking a European War; for, as I have shown, she wished on August 1 to continue negotiations with Russia.  The retort that she did so only when she knew that Germany was about to throw down the gauntlet, seems to me far-fetched.  Besides, Austria was not ready; Germany was.]

This was the first of Grey’s actions which betokened tension with Germany.  Up to the 28th his efforts for peace had seemed not unlikely to be crowned with success.  On July 20, that is three days before Austria precipitated the crisis, he begged the Berlin Government to seek to moderate her demands on Servia.  The day after the Austrian Note he urged a Conference between France and England on one side and Germany and Italy on the other so as to counsel moderation to their respective Allies, Russia and Austria.  It was Germany and Austria who negatived this by their acts of the 28th.  Still Grey worked for peace, with the approval of Russia, and, on July 30 to August 1, of Austria.  But on July 31 and August 1 occurred events which frustrated these efforts.  On July 31 the Berlin Government, hearing of the complete mobilisation by Russia (a retort to the similar proceeding of Austria a few hours earlier), sent a stiff demand to Petrograd for demobilisation within twelve hours; also to Paris for a reply within eighteen hours whether it would remain neutral in case of a Russo-German War.

Here we must pause to notice that to ask Russia to demobilise, without requiring the same measure from Austria, was manifestly unjust.  Russia could not have assented without occupying an inferior position to Austria.  If Germany had desired peace, she would have suggested the same action for each of the disputants.  Further, while blaming the Russians for mobilising, she herself had taken all the preliminary steps, including what is called Kriegsgefahr, which made her army far better prepared for war than mobilisation itself did for the Russian Empire in view of its comparatively undeveloped railway system.  Again, if the Kaiser wished to avoid war, why did he not agree to await the arrival (on August 1) of the special envoy, Tatisheff, whom, on the night of July 30, the Tsar had despatched to Berlin[556]?  There is not a single sign that the Berlin Government really feared “the Eastern Colossus,” though statements as to “the eastern peril” were very serviceable in frightening German Socialists into line.

[Footnote 556:  German White Book, No. 23_a_; J’accuse, Section III.  B, pp. 153, 164 (German edit.), shows that the German White Book suppressed the Tsar’s second telegram of July 29 to the Kaiser, inviting him to refer the Austro-Serb dispute to the Hague Tribunal. (See, too, J.W.  Headlam, History of Twelve Days, p. 183.)]