to intervene in the Austro-Serb affair.  The Austrian Ambassador at Berlin also opined that “Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war.”  This belief was widely expressed in diplomatic circles at Berlin.  Military men probably viewed matters from that standpoint; and in all probability there was a struggle between the civilians and the soldiers, which seems to have ended in a victory for the latter in an important Council meeting held at Potsdam on the evening of July 29.  Immediately afterwards the Chancellor summoned Sir Edward Goschen and made to him the “infamous proposals” for the neutrality of Great Britain in case of a European War, provided that Germany (1) would engage to take no territory from the mainland of France (he would make no promise respecting the French colonies); (2) would respect the neutrality of Holland; (3) would restore the independence of Belgium in case the French menace compelled her to invade that country.

These proposals prove that by the evening of July 29 Germany regarded war as imminent[553].  But why?  Even in the East matters did not as yet threaten such a conflict.  Russia had declared that Servia was not to be made a vassal of the Hapsburgs; and, to give effect to that declaration, she had mobilised the southern and eastern portions of her forces as a retort to a similar partial mobilisation by Austria.  But neither Russia nor, perhaps, Austria wished for, or expected, a European war[554].  Austria seems to have expected a limited war, i.e. only with the Serbs.  She denied that the Russians had any right to intervene so long as she did not annex Serb land.  Her aim was to reduce the Serbs to vassalage, and she expected Germany successfully to prevent Russia’s intervention, as in 1909[555].  The German proposals of July 29 are the first clear sign of a general conflict; for they presumed the probability of a war with France in which Belgium, and perhaps England, might be involved while Holland would be left alone.  In the course of his remarks the Chancellor said that “he had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany”—­a reference to the German offers of 1912 described in this chapter.  As at that time the Chancellor sought to tie our hands in view of any action by Germany, so, too, at present his object clearly was to preclude the possibility of our stirring on behalf of Belgium.  Both Goschen and Grey must have seen the snare.  The former referred the proposals to Grey, who of course decisively refused them.

[Footnote 553:  M. Jules Cambon telegraphed from Berlin to his Government on July 30 that late on July 29 Germany had ordered mobilisation, but countermanded it in view of the reserve of Sir Edward Goschen as to England’s attitude, and owing to the Tsar’s telegram of July 29 to the Kaiser.  Berlin papers which had announced the mobilisation were seized.  All measures preliminary to mobilisation had been taken (French Yellow Book, No. 107; German White Book, No. 21).]