offer—­why is not clear.  Austria was annoyed with the gains of Servia in the Peace of Bukharest, for which Kaiser William was largely responsible.  Probably, then, they differed as to some of the details of the Balkan settlement.  But it is far more probable that Germany checked the Austrians because she was not yet fully ready for vigorous action.  The doctrine of complete preparedness was edifyingly set forth by a well-informed writer, Rohrbach, who, in 1912, urged his countrymen to be patient.  In 1911 they had been wrong to worry France and England about Morocco, where German interests were not vital.  Until the Bagdad and Hedjaz Railways had neared their goals, Turkish co-operation in an attack on Egypt would be weak.  Besides, adds Rohrbach, the Kiel-North Sea Canal was not ready, and Heligoland and other coast defences were not sufficiently advanced for Germany confidently to face a war with England.  Thanks to the Kaiser, the fleet would soon be in a splendid condition, and then Germany could launch out boldly in the world.  The same course was urged by Count Reventlow early in 1914.  Germany must continue to arm, though fully conscious that she was “constructing for her foreign politics and diplomacy, a Calvary which nolens volens she would have to climb[547].”

[Footnote 547:  Rohrbach, Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt (1912), p. 216 (more than 10,000 copies of this work were sold in a year); Reventlow, Deutschlands auswaertige Politik, p. 251.]

Other evidence, especially from Bernhardi, Frobenius, and the works of the Pan-German and Navy Leagues, might be quoted in proof of Germany’s design to begin war when she was fully prepared.  Now, the immense sums voted in the War Budget of 1913 had not as yet provided the stores of artillery and ammunition that were to astonish the world.  Nor had Turkey recovered from the wounds of 1912.  Nor was the enlarged Kiel-North Sea Canal ready.  Its opening at Midsummer 1914 created a naval situation far more favourable to Germany.  A year earlier a French naval officer had prophesied that she would await the opening of the canal before declaring war[548].

[Footnote 548:  Revue des questions diplomatiques (1913), pp. 417-18.]

At Midsummer 1914 the general position was as follows.  Germany had reached the pitch of perfection in armaments, and the Kiel Canal was open.  France was unready, though the three years’ service promised to improve her army.  The Russian forces were slowly improving in number and cohesion.  Belgium also, alarmed by the German menace both in Europe and on the Congo, had in 1912-13 greatly extended the principle of compulsory service, so that in 1914 she would have more than 200,000 men available, and by 1926 as many as 340,000.  In naval strength it was unlikely that Germany would catch up Great Britain.  But the submarine promised to make even the most powerful ironclads of doubtful value.