The increases in the German army induced the French Chambers, in July 1913, to recur to three years’ military service, that of two years being considered inadequate in face of the new menace from beyond the Rhine[544].  Jaures and the Socialists, who advocated a national militia on the Swiss system, were beaten by 496 votes to 77, whereupon some of them resorted to obstructive tactics, and the measure was carried with some difficulty on July 8.  The General Confederation of Labour and the Anarchist Congress both announced their resolve to keep up the agitation in the army against the three years’ service.  Mutinous symptoms had already appeared.  The military equipment of the French army was officially admitted to be in an unsatisfactory state during the debate of July 13, 1914, when it appeared that France was far from ready for a campaign.  The peace strength of the army was then reckoned at 645,000 men.

[Footnote 544:  The Temps of March 30, 1913, estimated that Germany would soon have 500,000 men in her first line, as against 175,000 French, unless France recurred to three years’ service.  See M. Sembat, Faites un Roi, si non faites la Paix.]

In Russia in 1912 the chief efforts were concentrated on the navy.  As regards the army, it was proposed in the Budget of July 1913 to retain 300,000 men on active service for six months longer than before, thus strengthening the forces, especially during the winter months.  Apart from this measure (a reply to that of Germany) no important development took place in 1912-14.  The peace strength of the Russian army for Europe in 1914 exceeded 1,200,000[545].  That of Austria-Hungary exceeded 460,000 men, that of Italy 300,000 men.  Consequently the Triple Entente had on foot just over 2,000,000 men as against 1,590,000 for the Triple Alliance; but the latter group formed a solid well-prepared block, while the Triple Entente were separate units; and the Russian and British forces could not be speedily marshalled at the necessary points on the Continent.  Moreover, all great wars, especially from the time of Frederick the Great, have shown the advantage of the central position, if vigorously and skilfully used.

[Footnote 545:  G. Alexinsky, La Russie et la guerre, pp. 83-88.]

In these considerations lies the key to the European situation in the summer of 1914.  The simmering of fiscal discontent and unsated military pride in Germany caused general alarm, especially when the memories of the Wars of Liberation of 1813-14 were systematically used to excite bellicose ardour against France.  Against England it needed no official stimulus, for professors and teachers had long taught that “England was the foe.”  In particular preparations had been made in South-West Africa for stirring up a revolt of the Boers as a preliminary to the expulsion of the British from South Africa.  Relations had been established with De Wet and Maritz.  In 1913 the latter sent an agent to the German colony asking