CHAPTER XXIII

THE CRISIS OF 1914

“We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we have in the literal operation of the guarantee.  It is found in the answer to the question whether this country would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history and thus become participators in the sin.”—­GLADSTONE: 

     Speech of August 1870.

The Prussian and German Army Bills of 1860 and onwards have tended to make military preparedness a weighty factor in the recent development of nations; and the issue of events has too often been determined, not by the justice of a cause, but rather by the armed strength at the back of it.  We must therefore glance at the military and naval preparations which enabled the Central Powers to win their perilous triumph over Russia and the Slavs of the Balkans.  In April 1912 the German Chancellor introduced to the Reichstag Army and Navy Bills (passed on May 21) providing for great increases in the navy, also forces amounting to two new army corps, and that, too, though Germany’s financial position was admitted to be “very serious,” and the proposed measures merely precautionary.  Nevertheless, only Socialists, Poles, and Alsatians voted against them.  But the events of the first Balkan War were cited as menacing Germany with a conflict in which she “might have to protect, against several enemies, frontiers which are extended and by nature to a large extent open.”  A new Army Bill was therefore introduced in March 1913 (passed in June), which increased the total of the forces by 145,000, and raised their peace strength in 1914 to more than 870,000 men.  The Chancellor referred gratefully to “the extraordinary ability and spirit of conciliation” of Sir Edward Grey during the Conference at London, and admitted that a collision between Germans and Slavs was not inevitable; but Germany must take precautions, this, too, at a time when Russia and Austria agreed to place their forces again on a peace footing.  Germany, far from relaxing her efforts after the sharp rebuff to the Slavonic cause in the summer of 1913, continued her military policy.  It caused grave apprehension, especially as the new drastic taxes (estimated to produce L50,000,000) were loudly declared a burden that could not long be borne.  As to the naval proposals, the Chancellor commended Mr. Churchill’s suggestion (on March 26) of a “naval holiday,” but said there were many difficulties in the way.

The British Naval Budget of 1912 had provided for a six years’ programme of 25 Dreadnoughts against Germany’s 14; and for every extra German ship two British would be added.  In March 1913 this was continued, with the offer of a “holiday” for 1914 if Germany would soon accept.  No acceptance came.  The peace strength of the British Regular Army was reckoned early in 1914 at 156,000 men, with about 250,000 effective Territorials.