Thus, efforts for a good understanding with Germany broke down owing to the exacting demands of German diplomacy for our neutrality in all circumstances (including, of course, a German invasion of Belgium).  Thereupon she proceeded with a new Navy Act (the fifth in fourteen years) for a large increase in construction[538].

[Footnote 538:  Castle and Hurd, German Naval Power, pp. 142-152.]

Perhaps Germany would have been more conciliatory if she had foreseen the events of the following autumn.  As has already appeared, Italy’s attack upon the Turks (coinciding with difficulties which their rigour raised up) furnished the opportunity—­for which the Balkan States had been longing—­to shake off the Turkish yoke.  On March 13, 1912, Servia and Bulgaria framed a secret treaty of alliance against Turkey, which contained conditions as to joint action against Austria or Roumania, if they attacked, and a general understanding as to the partition of Macedonia.  Greece came into the agreement later[539].  No time was fixed for action against Turkey; but in view of her obstinacy and intolerance action was inevitable.  She precipitated matters by massacring Christians in and on the borders of Macedonia.  Thereupon the three States and Montenegro demanded the enforcement of the reforms and toleration guaranteed by the Treaty of Berlin (see p. 242).  The Turks having as usual temporised (though they were still at war with Italy[540]), the four States demanded complete autonomy and the reconstruction of frontiers according to racial needs.  Both sides rejected the joint offers of Austria and Russia for friendly intervention; whereupon Turkey declared war upon Bulgaria and Servia (October 17).  On the morrow Greece declared war upon her.  Montenegro had already opened hostilities.  In view of these facts, the later assertions of the German Powers, that the Balkan League was a Russian plot for overthrowing Turkey and weakening Teutonic influence, is palpably false.  Turkey had treated her Christian subjects (including the once faithful Albanians) worse than ever.  Their union against Turkey had long been foretold.  It was helped on by Ottoman misrule, and finally cemented by massacre.  Further, Russia and Austria acted together in seeking to avert an attack on Turkey; and the Powers collectively warned the Balkan States that no changes of boundary would be tolerated.  Those States refused to accept the European fiat; for the present misrule was intolerable, and the inability of the Turks to cope with either the Italians or the Albanian rebels opened a vista of hope.  The German accusations levelled at Russia were obviously part of the general scheme adopted at Berlin and Vienna for exasperating public opinion against the Slav cause.

[Footnote 539:  The claim that the Greek statesman, Venizelos, founded the league seems incorrect.  So, too, is the rumour that Russia, through her minister, Hartvig, at Belgrade, framed it (but see N. Jorga, Hist. des Etats balcaniques, p. 436).  Miliukoff, in a “Report to the Carnegie Foundation,” denies this.  The plan occurred to many men so soon as Turkish Reform proved a sham.  Venizelos is said to have mooted it to Mr. James Bourchier in May 1911. (R.  Rankin, Inner History of the Balkan War, p. 13.)]