Thus ended the year 1911.  Frenchmen were sore at discovering that the Entente entailed no obligation on our part to help them by force of arms[536]; and Germans, far from rejoicing at their easy acquisition of a new colony, harboured resentment against both the Western Powers.  Britons had been aroused from party strifes and Labour quarrels by finding new proofs of the savage enmity with which Junkers, Colonials, and Pan-Germans regarded them; and the problem was—­Should England seek to regain Germany’s friendship, meanwhile remaining aloof from close connections with France and Russia; or should she recognise that her uncertain attitude possessed all the disadvantages and few of the advantages of a definite alliance?

[Footnote 536:  Hanotaux, La Politique de l’Equilibre, p. 419.]

Early in 1912 light was thrown on the situation, and the Berlin Government thenceforth could not plead ignorance as to our intentions; for efforts, both public and private, were made to improve Anglo-German relations.  Mr. Churchill advocated a friendly understanding in naval affairs.  Lord Haldane also visited Berlin on an official invitation.  He declared to that Government that “we would in no circumstances be a party to any sort of aggression upon Germany.”  But we must oppose a violation of the neutrality of Belgium, and, if the naval competition continued, we should lay down two keels to Germany’s one.  As a sequel to these discussions the two Governments discussed the basis of an Entente.  It soon appeared that Germany sought to bind us almost unconditionally to neutrality in all cases.  To this the British Cabinet demurred, but suggested the following formula: 

The two Powers being mutually desirous of securing peace and friendship between them, England declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany.  Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object.

Further than this it refused to go; and Mr. Asquith in his speech of October 2, 1914, at Cardiff thus explained the reason: 

They [the Germans] wanted us to go further.  They asked us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of Germany being engaged in war, and this, mark you, at a time when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and defensive resources, and especially upon the sea.  They asked us (to put it quite plainly) for a free hand, so far as we were concerned, when they selected the opportunity to overbear, to dominate, the European World.  To such a demand, but one answer was possible, and that was the answer we gave[537].

[Footnote 537:  See Times of October 3, 1914, and July 20, 1915 (with quotations from the North German Gazette).  Bethmann-Hollweg declared to the Reichstag, on August 19, 1915, that Asquith’s statement was false; but in a letter published on August 26, and an official statement of September 1, 1915, Sir E. Grey convincingly refuted him.]