Many Frenchmen and Belgians credited the German colonial party with the design of acquiring the whole of the French Congo, as a first step towards annexing the Belgian Congo[535].  Belgium became alarmed, and in 1913 greatly extended the principle of compulsory military service.  On the other hand, the German Chauvinists certainly desired the acquisition of a naval base in Morocco which would help to link up their naval stations and facilitate the conquest of a World Empire.  This was the policy set forth by Bernhardi in the closing parts of his work, Germany and the next War, where he protested against the Chancellor’s surrender of Morocco as degrading to the nation and damaging to its future.  Following the lead of Treitschke, he depreciated colonies rich merely in products; for Germany needed homes for her children in future generations, and she must fight for them with all her might at the first favourable opportunity.  This is the burden of Bernhardi’s message, which bristles with rage at the loss of Morocco.  He regarded that land as more important than the Congo; for, in addition to the strategic value of its coasts, it offered a fulcrum in the west whereby to raise the Moslems against the Triple Entente.  In the Epilogue he writes:  “Our relations with Islam have changed for the worse by the abandonment of Morocco. . . .  We have lost prestige in the whole Mohammedan world, which is a matter of the first importance for us.”

[Footnote 535:  Hanotaux, La Politique de l’Equilibre, p. 417.]

The logical conclusion of Bernhardi’s thesis was that Germany and Austria should boldly side with the Moors and Turks against France and Italy, summoning Islam to arms, if need be, against Christendom.  Perhaps if Turkey had possessed the 1,500,000 troops whom her War Minister, Chevket Pacha, was hopefully striving to raise, this might have been the outcome of events.  As it was, Realpolitik counselled prudence, and the observance of the forms of Christianity.

Certainly there was no sufficient pretext for war.  France and Russia had humoured Germany.  As to “the real enemy,” light was thrown on her attitude during the debate of November 27, 1911, at Westminster.  Sir Edward Grey then stated that we had consistently helped on, and not impeded, the Franco-German negotiations.  Never had we played the dog-in-the-manger to Germany.  In fact, the Berlin Government would greatly have eased the tension if she had declared earlier that she did not intend to take part of Morocco.  Further, the Entente with France (made public on November 24) contained no secret articles; nor were there any in any compact made by the British Government.  On December 6, Mr. Asquith declared that we had no secret engagement with any Power obliging us to take up arms.  “We do not desire to stand in the light of any Power which wants to find its place in the sun.  The first of British interests is, as it always has been, the peace of the world; and to its attainment British diplomacy and policy will be directed.”  The German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, also said in the Reichstag, “We also, sirs, sincerely desire to live in peace and friendship with England”—­an announcement received with complete silence.  Some applause greeted his statement that he would welcome any definite proof that England desired friendlier relations with Germany.