Again, as at Tangiers in 1905, Germany’s procedure was needlessly provocative if, as the agreement of 1909 declared, her interests in Morocco were solely commercial.  If this were so, why send a war-ship, when diplomatic insistence on the terms of 1909 would have met the needs of the case, especially as German trade with Morocco was less than half that of French firms and less than one-third that of British firms?  Obviously, Germany was bent on something more than the maintenance of her trade (which, indeed, the French were furthering by suppressing anarchy); otherwise she would not have risked the chance of a collision which might at any time result from the presence of a German cruiser alongside French war-ships in a small harbour.

It is almost certain that the colonial and war parties at Berlin sought to drive on the Kaiser to hostilities.  The occasion was favourable.  In the spring of 1911 France was a prey to formidable riots of vine-growers.  On June 28 occurred an embarrassing change of Ministry.  Besides, the French army and navy had not yet recovered from the Socialist regime of previous years.  The remodelling of the Russian army was also very far from complete.  Moreover, the Tsar and Kaiser had come to a friendly understanding at Potsdam in November 1910, respecting Persia and their attitude towards other questions, so that it was doubtful whether Russia would assist France if French action in Morocco could be made to appear irregular.  As for Great Britain, her ability to afford sufficiently large and timely succour to the French was open to question.  In the throes of a sharp constitutional crisis, and beset by acute Labour troubles, she was ill-fitted even to defend herself.  By the close of 1911 the Navy would include only fourteen first-class ships as against Germany’s nine; while Austria was also becoming a Naval Power.  The weakness of France and England had appeared in the spring when they gave way before Germany’s claims in Asia Minor.  On March 18, 1911, by a convention with Turkey she acquired the right to construct from the Bagdad Railway a branch line to Alexandretta, together with large privileges over that port which made it practically German, and the natural outlet for Mesopotamia and North Syria, heretofore in the sphere of Great Britain and France.  True, she waived conditionally her claim to push the Bagdad line to the Persian Gulf; but her recent bargain with the Tsar at Potsdam gave her the lion’s share of the trade of Western Persia.

After taking these strides in the Levant, Germany ought not to have shown jealousy of French progress in Morocco, where her commerce was small.  As in 1905, she was clearly using the occasion to test the validity of the Anglo-French Entente and the effectiveness of British support to France.  Probably, too, she desired either a territorial acquisition in South Morocco, for which the colonial party and most of the Press were clamouring; or she intended, in lieu of it, to acquire the French Congo.  At present it is not clear at which of these objects she aimed.  Kiderlen-Waechter declared privately that Germany must have the Agadir district, and would never merely accept in exchange Congolese territory[533].