The chief danger to public tranquillity arises from the vigorous expansion of some peoples and the decay of others.  Nearly all the great nations of Europe are expansive; but on their fringe lie other peoples, notably the Turks, Persians, Koreans, and the peoples of North Africa, who are in a state of decline or semi-anarchy.  In such a state of things friction is inevitable and war difficult to avoid, unless in the councils of the nations goodwill and generosity prevail over the suspicion and greed which are too often the dominant motives.  Scarcely was the Bosnian-Turkish crisis over before Morocco once more became a danger to the peace of the world.

There the anarchy continued, with results that strained the relations between France and Germany.  Nevertheless, on February 8, 1909 (probably owing to the friendly offices of Great Britain[531]), the two rivals came to an agreement that France should respect the independence of Morocco and not oppose German trade in that quarter, while Germany declared that her sole interests there were commercial, and that she would not oppose “the special political interests of France in that country[532].”  But, as trade depended on the maintenance of order, this vague compact involved difficulties.  Clearly, if disorders continued, the task of France would be onerous and relatively unprofitable, for she would be working largely for the benefit of British and German traders.  Indeed, the new Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, admitted to the French ambassador, Jules Cambon, that thenceforth Morocco was a fruit destined to fall into the lap of France; only she must humour public opinion in Germany.  Unfortunately, the “Consortium,” for joint commercial enterprises of French and Germans in Morocco and the French Congo, broke down on points of detail; and this produced a very sore feeling in Germany in the spring of 1911.  Further, as the Moorish rebels pushed their raids up to the very gates of Fez, French troops in those same months proceeded to march to that capital (April 1911).  The Kaiser saw in that move, and a corresponding advance of Spanish troops in the North, a design to partition Morocco.  Failing to secure what he considered satisfactory assurances, he decided to send to Agadir a corvette, the Panther (July 1, 1911), replaced by a cruiser, the Berlin.

[Footnote 531:  Rachfahl, p. 310.]

[Footnote 532:  Morel, App.  XIV.]

Behind him were ambitious parties which sought to compass world-predominance for Germany.  The Pan-German, Colonial, and Navy Leagues had gained enormous influence since 1905, when they induced the Kaiser to visit Tangiers; and early in 1911 they issued pamphlets urging the annexation of part of Morocco.  The chief, termed West-Marokko deutsch, was inspired by the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Kiderlen-Waechter, who thereafter urged officially that the Government must take into account public opinion—­which he himself had manipulated.