[Footnote 517:  In an interview with M. Tardieu at Baden-Baden on October 4, 1905, Buelow said that Germany intervened in Morocco because of her interests there, and also to protest against this new attempt to isolate her (Tardieu, Questions actuelles de Politique etrangere, p. 87).  If so, her conduct increased that isolation.  Probably the second Anglo-Japanese Treaty of August 12, 1905 (published on September 27), was due to fear of German aggression.  France and Germany came to a preliminary agreement as to Morocco on September 28.]

The chief difficulty of the situation was that it committed France to two gigantic tasks, that of pacifying Morocco and also of standing up to the Kaiser in Europe.  In this respect the ground for the conflict was all in his favour; and both he and she knew it.  Consequently, a compromise was desirable; and the Kaiser himself, in insisting on the holding of a Conference, built a golden bridge over which France might draw back, certainly with honour, probably with success; for in the diplomatic sphere she was at least as strong as he.  When, therefore, Delcasse objected to the Conference, his colleagues accepted his resignation (June 6).  His fall was hailed at Berlin as a humiliation for France.  Nevertheless, her complaisance earned general sympathy, while the bullying tone of German diplomacy, continued during the Conference held at Algeciras, hardened the opposition of nearly all the Powers, including the United States.  Especially noteworthy was the declaration of Italy that her interests were identical with those of England.  German proposals were supported by Austria alone, who therefore gained from the Kaiser the doubtful compliment of having played the part of “a brilliant second” to Germany.

It is needless to describe at length the Act of Algeciras (April 7, 1906).  It established a police and a State Bank in Morocco, suppressed smuggling and the illicit trade in arms, reformed the taxes, and set on foot public works.  Of course, little resulted from all this; but the position of France was tacitly regularised, and she was left free to proceed with pacific penetration.  “We are neither victors nor vanquished,” said Buelow in reviewing the Act; and M. Rouvier echoed the statement for France.  In reality, Germany had suffered a check.  Her chief aim was to sever the Anglo-French Entente, and she failed.  She sought to rally Italy to her side, and she failed; for Italy now proclaimed her accord with France on Mediterranean questions.  Finally the North German Gazette paid a tribute to the loyal and peaceable aims of French policy; while other less official German papers deplored the mistakes of their Government, which had emphasised the isolation of Germany[518].  This is indeed the outstanding result of the Conference.  The threatening tone of Berlin had disgusted everybody.  Above all it brought to more cordial relations the former rivals, Great Britain and Russia.