[Footnote 514:  Buelow, Imperial Germany, p. 83.]

On the other hand, the feuds of the Moorish tribes vitally concerned France because they led to many raids into her Algerian lands which she could not merely repel.  In 1901 she adopted a more active policy, that of “pacific penetration,” and, by successive compacts with Italy, Great Britain, and Spain, secured a kind of guardianship over Moroccan affairs.  This policy, however, aroused deep resentment at Berlin.  Though Germany was pacifically penetrating Turkey and Asia Minor, she grudged France her success in Morocco, not for commercial reasons but for others, closely connected with high diplomacy and world-policy.  As the German historian, Rachfahl, declared, Morocco was to be a test of strength[515].

[Footnote 515:  Tardieu, Questions diplomatiques de 1904, pp. 56-102; Rachfahl, Kaiser und Reich, pp. 230-241; E.D.  Morel, Morocco in Diplomacy, chaps, i-xii.]

In one respect Germany had cause for complaint.  On October 6, 1904, France signed a Convention with Spain in terms that were suspiciously vague.  They were interpreted by secret articles which defined the spheres of French and Spanish influence in case the rule of the Sultan of Morocco ceased.  It does not appear that Germany was aware of these secret articles at the time of her intervention[516].  But their existence, even perhaps their general tenor, was surmised.  The effective causes of her intervention were, firstly, her resolve to be consulted in every matter of importance, and, secondly, the disaster that befel the Russians at Mukden early in March 1905.  At the end of the month, the Kaiser landed at Tangier and announced in strident terms that he came to visit the Sultan as an independent sovereign.  This challenge to French claims produced an acute crisis.  Delcasse desired to persevere with pacific penetration; but in the debate of April 19 the deficiencies of the French military system were admitted with startling frankness; and a threat from Berlin revealed the intention of humiliating France, and, if possible, of severing the Anglo-French Entente.  Here, indeed, is the inner significance of the crisis.  Germany had lately declared her indifference to all but commercial questions in Morocco.  But she now made use of the collapse of Russia to seek to end the Anglo-French connection which she had recently declared to be harmless.  The aim obviously was to sow discord between those two Powers.  In this she failed.  Lord Lansdowne and Delcasse lent each other firm support, so much so that the Paris Temps accused us of pushing France on in a dangerous affair which did not vitally concern her.  The charge was not only unjust but ungenerous; for Germany had worked so as to induce England to throw over France or make France throw over England.  The two Governments discerned the snare, and evaded it by holding firmly together[517].

[Footnote 516:  Rachfahl, pp. 235, 238.  For details, see Morel, chap. ii.]