[Footnote 512:  Sir Thomas Barclay, Anglo-French Reminiscences (1876-1906), ch. xviii-xxii; M. Hanotaux (La Politique de l’Equilibre, p. 415) claims that Mr. Chamberlain was chiefly instrumental in starting the negotiations leading to the Entente with France.]

Stated briefly, France gave way on most of the questions named above, except one, that is, Morocco.  There she attained her end, the recognition by us of her paramount claims.  For this she conceded most of the points in dispute between the two countries in Egypt, though she maintains her Law School, hospitals, mission schools, and a few other institutions.  Thenceforth England had opposed to her in that land only German influence and the Egyptian nationalists and Pan-Islam fanatics whom it sought to encourage.  France also renounced some of her fishing rights in Newfoundland in return for gains of territory on the River Gambia and near Lake Chad.  In return for these concessions she secured from us the recognition of her claim to watch over the tranquillity of Morocco, together with an offer of assistance for all “the administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it needs.”  True, she promised not to change the political condition of Morocco, as also to maintain equality of commercial privileges.  Great Britain gave a similar undertaking for Egypt[513].

[Footnote 513:  A. Tardieu, Questions diplomatiques de l’annee 1904, Appendix II.  England in 1914 annulled the promise respecting Egypt because of the declaration of war by Turkey and the assistance afforded her by the Khedive, Abbas II. (see Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt and Abbas II.), On February 15, 1904, France settled by treaty with Siam frontier disputes of long standing.]

The Anglo-French Entente of 1904 is the most important event of modern diplomacy.  Together with the preceding treaty of arbitration, it removed all likelihood of war between two nations which used to be “natural enemies”; and the fact that it in no respect menaced Germany appeared in the communication of its terms to the German ambassador in Paris shortly before its signature.  On April 12 Buelow declared to the Reichstag his approval of the compact as likely to end disputes in several quarters, besides assuring peace and order in Morocco, where Germany’s interests were purely commercial.  Two days later, in reply to the Pan-German leader, Count Reventlow, he said he would not embark Germany on any enterprise in Morocco.  These statements were reasonable and just.  The Entente lessened the friction between Great Britain and Russia during untoward incidents of the Russo-Japanese War.  After the conclusion of the Entente the Russian ambassador in Paris publicly stated the approval of his Government, and, quoting the proverb, “The friends of our friends are our friends,” added with a truly prophetic touch—­“Who knows whether that will not be true?” The agreement also served to strengthen the position of France at a time when her internal crisis and the first Russian defeats in the Far East threatened to place her almost at the mercy of Germany.  A dangerous situation would have arisen if France had not recently gained the friendship both of England and Italy.