Still more significant was the new alliance as a warning to Russia not to push too far her enterprises in the Far East.  On April 12, 1902, she agreed with China to evacuate Manchuria; but (as has appeared in Chapter XX.) she finally pressed on, not only in Manchuria, but also in Korea, in which the Anglo-Japanese treaty recognised that Japan had predominant interests.  For this forward policy Russia had the general support of the Kaiser, whose aims in the Near East were obviously served by the transference thence of Russia’s activities to the Far East.  It is, indeed, probable that he and his agents desired to embroil Russia and Japan.  Certain it is that the Russian people regarded the Russo-Japanese War, which began in February 1904, as “The War of the Grand Dukes.”  The Russian troops fought an uphill fight loyally and doggedly, but with none of the enthusiasm so conspicuous in the present truly national struggle.  In Manchuria the mistakes and incapacity of their leaders led to an almost unbroken series of defeats, ending with the protracted and gigantic contests around Mukden (March 1-10, 1905).  The almost complete destruction of the Russian Baltic fleet by Admiral Togo at the Battle of Tsushima (May 27-28) ended the last hopes of the Tsar and his ministers; and, fearful of the rising discontent in Russia, they accepted the friendly offers of the United States for mediation.  By the Treaty of Portsmouth (Sept. 5, 1905) they ceded to Japan the southern half of Saghalien and the Peninsula on which stands Port Arthur:  they also agreed to evacuate South Manchuria and to recognise Korea as within Japan’s sphere of influence.  No war indemnity was paid.  Indeed it could not be exacted, as Japan occupied no Russian territory which she did not intend to annex.  To Russia the material results of the war were the loss of some 350,000 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners; of two fleets; and of the valuable provinces and ice-free harbours for the acquisition of which she had constructed the Trans-Siberian Railway.  So heavy a blow had not been dealt to a Great Power since the fall of Napoleon III.; and worse, perhaps, than the material loss was that of prestige in accepting defeat at the hands of an Island State, whose people fifty years before fought with bows and arrows.

Japan emerged from the war triumphant, but financially exhausted.  Accordingly, she was not loath to conclude with Russia, on July 30, 1907, a convention which adjusted outstanding questions in a friendly manner[509].  The truth about this Russo-Japanese rapprochement is, of course, not known; but it may reasonably be ascribed in part to the good services of England (then about to frame an entente with Russia); and in part to the suspicion of the statesmen of Petrograd and Tokio that German influences had secretly incited Russia to the policy of reckless exploitation in Korea which led to war and disaster.

[Footnote 509:  Hayashi, op. cit. ch. viii. and App.  D. On June 10, 1907, Japan concluded with France an agreement, for which see Hayashi, ch. vi. and App.  C.]