In October 1901 Germany proposed to the United Kingdom that each Power should guarantee the possessions of the other in every Continent except Asia.  Why Asia was excepted is not clear, unless Germany wished to give Russia a free hand in that Continent.  The Berlin Government laid stress on the need of our support in North and South America, where its aim of undermining the Monroe Doctrine was notorious.  The proposed guarantee would also have compelled us to assist Germany in any dispute that might arise between her and France about Alsace-Lorraine or colonial questions.  The aim was obvious, to gain the support of the British fleet either against the United States or France.  A British diplomatist of high repute, who visited Berlin, has declared that the German Foreign Office made use of garbled and misleading documents to win him over to these views[507].  It was in vain.  The British Government was not to be hoodwinked; and, as soon as it declined these compromising proposals, a storm of abuse swept through the German Press at the barbarities of British troops in South Africa.  That incident ended all chance of an understanding, either between the two Governments or the two peoples.

[Footnote 507:  Quarterly Review, Oct. 1914, pp. 426-9.]

The inclusion of Germany in the Anglo-Japanese compact proving to be impossible, the two Island Powers signed a treaty of alliance at London on January 30, 1902.  It guaranteed the maintenance of the status quo in the Far East, and offered armed assistance by either signatory in the event of its ally being attacked by more than one Power[508].  The alliance ended the isolation of the British race, and marked the entry of Japan into the circle of the World-Powers.  The chief objections to the new departure were its novelty, and the likelihood of its embroiling us finally with Russia and France or Russia and Germany.  These fears were groundless; for France and even Russia(!) expressed their satisfaction at the treaty.  Lord Lansdowne’s diplomatic coup not only ended the isolation of two Island States, which had been severally threatened by powerful rivals; it also safeguarded China; and finally, by raising the prestige of Great Britain, it helped to hasten the end of the Boer War.  During the discussion of their future policy by the Boer delegates at Vereeniging on May 30, General Botha admitted that he no longer had any hope of intervention from the Continent of Europe; for their deputation thither had failed.  All the leaders except De Wet agreed, and they came to terms with Lords Kitchener and Milner at Pretoria on May 31.  That the Anglo-Japanese compact ended the last hopes of the Boers for intervention can scarcely be doubted.

[Footnote 508:  E.g., if the Russians alone attacked Japan we were not bound to help her:  but if the French also attacked Japan we must help her.  The aim clearly was to prevent Japan being overborne as in 1895 (see p. 577).  The treaty was signed for five years, but was renewed on August 12, 1905, and in July 1911.]