[Footnote 504:  Reventlow, Deutschlands auswaertige Politik, pp. 178-9; Mr. Chamberlain’s Speeches, vol. ii. p. 68.]

Nevertheless, at first Great Britain sought to come to a friendly understanding with Germany in the Far East, probably with a view to preventing the schemes of partition of China which in 1900 assumed a menacing guise.  At that time Russia seemed likely to take the lead in those designs.  But opposite to the Russian stronghold of Port Arthur was the German province of Kiao Chau, in which the Kaiser took a deep interest.  His resolve to play a leading part in Chinese affairs appeared in his speech to the German troops sent out in 1900 to assist in quelling the Boxer Rising.  He ordered them to adopt methods of terrorism like those of Attila’s Huns, so that “no Chinaman will ever again dare to look askance at a German.”  The orders were ruthlessly obeyed.  After the capture of Pekin by the Allies (September 1900) there ensued a time of wary balancing.  Russia and Germany were both suspected of designs to cut up China; but they were opposed by Great Britain and Japan.  This obscure situation was somewhat cleared by the statesmen of London and Berlin agreeing to maintain the territorial integrity of China and freedom of trade (October 1900).  But in March 1901 the German Chancellor, Prince von Buelow, nullified the agreement by officially announcing that it did not apply to, or limit, the expansion of Russia in Manchuria.  What caused this volte face is not known; but it implied a renunciation of the British policy of the status quo in the Far East and an official encouragement to Russia to push forward to the Pacific Ocean, where she was certain to come into conflict with Japan.  Such a collision would enfeeble those two Powers; while Germany, as tertius gaudens would be free to work her will both in Europe and Asia[505].

[Footnote 505:  In September 1895 the Tsar thanked Prince Hohenlohe for supporting his Far East policy, and said he was weary of Armenia and distrustful of England; so, too, in September 1896, when Russo-German relations were also excellent (Hohenlohe Mems., Eng. edit., ii. 463, 470).]

On the other hand, Eckardstein, the German ambassador in London, is said to have made proposals of an Anglo-German-Japanese Alliance in March-April 1901.  If we may trust the work entitled Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi (Japanese ambassador in London) these proposals were dangled for some weeks, why, he could never understand.  Probably Germany was playing a double game; for Hayashi believed that she had a secret understanding with Russia on these questions.  He found that the Salisbury Cabinet welcomed her adhesion to the principles of maintaining the territorial integrity of China and of freedom of commerce in the Far East[506].

[Footnote 506:  Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi (London, 1915), pp. 97-131.  There are suspicious features about this book.  I refer to it with all reserve.  Reventlow (Deutschlands auswaertige Politik, p. 178) thinks Eckardstein may have been playing his own game—­an improbable suggestion.]