Even those Germans who did not espouse these ambitious schemes became deeply imbued with the expansively patriotic ideas championed by the Kaiser.  So far back as 1890 he ordered their enforcement in the universities and schools[503].  Thenceforth professors and teachers vied in their eagerness to extol the greatness of Germany and the civilising mission of the Hohenzollerns, whose exploits in the future were to eclipse all the achievements of Frederick the Great and William I. Moreover, the new German Navy was acclaimed as a necessary means to the triumph of German Kultur throughout the world.  Other nations were depicted as slothful, selfish, decadent; and the decline in the prestige of Great Britain, France, and Russia to some extent justified these pretensions.  The Tsar, by turning away from the Balkans towards Korea, deadened Slav aspirations.  For the time Pan-Slavism seemed moribund.  Pan-Germanism became a far more threatening force.

[Footnote 503:  Latterly, the catchword, England ist der Feind ("England is the enemy"), has been taught in very many schools.]

Summing up, and including one topic that will soon be dealt with, we may conclude as follows:  Germany showed that she did not want England’s friendship, save in so far as it would help her to oppose the Monroe Doctrine or supply her with money to finish the Bagdad Railway.  For reasons that have been explained, she and Austria were likely to undermine British interests in the Near East; while, on the other hand, the diversion of Russia’s activities from Central Asia and the Balkans to the Far East, lessened the Muscovite menace which had so long determined the trend of British policy.  Moreover, Russia’s ally, France, showed a conciliatory spirit.  Forgetting the rebuff at Fashoda (see ante, pp. 501-6), she aimed at expansion in Morocco.  Now, Korea and Morocco did not vitally concern us.  The Bagdad Railway and the Kaiser’s court to Pan-Islamism were definite threats to our existence as an Empire.  Finally, the development of the German Navy and the growth of a furiously anti-British propaganda threatened the long and vulnerable East Coast of Great Britain.

A temporary understanding with Germany could have been attained if we had acquiesced in her claim for maritime equality and in the oriental and colonial enterprises which formed its sequel.  But that course, by yielding to her undisputed ascendancy in all parts of the world, would have led to a policy of partition.  Now, since 1688, British statesmen have consistently opposed, often by force of arms, a policy of partition at the expense of civilised nations.  Their aim has been to support the weaker European States against the stronger and more aggressive, thus assuring a Balance of Power which in general has proved to be the chief safeguard of peace.  In seeking an Entente with France, and subsequently with Russia, British policy has followed the course consistent with the counsels of moderation and the teachings of experience.  We may note here that the German historian, Count Reventlow, has pointed out that the Berlin Government could not frame any lasting agreement with the British; for, sooner or later, they would certainly demand the limitation of Germany’s colonial aims and of her naval development, to neither of which could she consent.  The explanation is highly significant[504].