The war produced similar impressions on the German people.  Dislike of England, always acute in Prussia, especially in reactionary circles, now spread to all parts and all classes of the nation; and the Kaiser, as we have seen, made skilful use of it to further his naval policy.  His speech at Hamburg on October 18, 1899, on the need of a great navy, marked the beginning of a new era, destined to end in war with Great Britain.  Admiral von Tirpitz, in introducing the Amending Bill of February 1900, demanded the doubling of the navy in a scheme working automatically until 1920.  The Socialist leader, Bebel, opposed it as certain to strain relations with England, a war with whom would be the greatest possible misfortune for the German people.  On the other hand, the Chancellor, Prince Hohenlohe, voiced the opinions of the governing class and the German Navy League when he declared that the demand for a great navy originated in the ambition of the German nation to become a World-Power[500].  The Bill passed; and thenceforth the United Kingdom and Germany became declared rivals at sea.  Fortunately for the islanders, the new German Navy could not be ready for action before the year 1904; otherwise, a very dangerous situation would have arisen.  Even as it was, British statesmen were induced to secure an ally and to end the Boer War as quickly as possible.

[Footnote 500:  Prince Hohenlohe, Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 480.]

During that conflict the tension between England and the Dual Alliance (France and Russia) was at times so acute as to render it doubtful whether we should not gravitate towards the rival Triple Alliance.  The problem was the most important that had confronted British statesmen during a century.  Kinship and tradition seemed to beckon us towards Germany and Austria.  On the other hand, democracy and social intercourse told in favour of the French connection.  Further, now that Russia was retiring more and more from her Balkan and Central Asian projects in order to concentrate on the Far East, she ceased to threaten India and the Levant.  Moreover, the personality of the Tsar, Nicholas II., was reassuring, while that of Kaiser Wilhelm II. aroused distrust and alarm.

In truth, the inordinate vanity, restless energy, and flamboyant Chauvinism of the Kaiser placed great difficulties in the way of an Anglo-German Entente.  An article believed to have been inspired by Bismarck contained the following reference to the Kaiser’s megalomania:  “It causes the deepest anxiety in Germany, because it is feared that it may lead to some irreparable piece of want of tact, and thence to war.  For it is argued that, vanity being at the bottom of it all, and the Emperor finding he is unable to gain the premature immortality he thirsts for by peaceful prodigies, his restless nervous irritability may degenerate into recklessness, and then his megalomania may blind him to the dangers he and, above all, poor blood-soaken Germany may encounter on the war-path[501].”  Kaiser William possesses more power of self-restraint than this passage indicates; for, though he has spread a warlike enthusiasm through his people, he has also restrained it until there arrived a fit opportunity for its exercise.  It arrived when Germany and her Allies were far better prepared, both by land and sea, than the Powers whom she expected to meet in arms.