The loss of time was as fatal as it was singular under the rule of a Napoleon whose uncle had so often shattered his foes by swift movements of troops.  In 1870 Napoleonic France had nothing but speed and dash on which to count.  Numbers were against her.  In 1869 Marshal Leboeuf had done away with the Garde Mobile, a sort of militia which had involved only fifteen days’ drill in the year; and the Garde Nationale of the towns was less fit for campaigning than the re-formed Mobiles proved to be later on in the war.  Thus France had no reserves:  everything rested on the 330,000 men struggling towards the frontiers.  It is doubtful whether there were more than 220,000 men in the first line by August 6, with some 50,000 more in reserve at Metz, etc.

Against them Germany could at once put into the field 460,000 infantry, 56,000 cavalry, with 1584 cannon; and she could raise these forces to some 1,180,000 men by calling out all the reserves and Landwehr.  These last were men who had served their time and had not, as a rule, lost their soldierly qualities in civil life.  Nearly 400,000 highly trained troops were ready to invade France early in August.

In view of these facts it seems incredible that Ollivier, the French Prime Minister, could have publicly stated that he entered on war with a light heart.  Doubtless, Ministers counted on help from Austria or Italy, perhaps from both; but, as it proved, they judged too hastily.  As was stated in Chapter I. of this work, Austria was not likely to move as long as Russia favoured the cause of Prussia; for any threatening pressure of the Muscovites on the open flank of the Hapsburg States, Galicia, has sufficed to keep them from embarking on a campaign in the West.  In this case, the statesmen of Vienna are said to have known by July 20 that Russia would quietly help Prussia; she informed the Hapsburg Government that any increase in its armaments would be met by a corresponding increase in those of Russia.  The meaning of such a hint was clear; and Austria decided not to seek revenge for Koeniggraetz unless the French triumph proved to be overwhelming.  As for Italy, her alliance with France alone was very improbable for the reasons previously stated.

Another will o’ the wisp which flitted before the ardent Bonapartists who pushed on the Emperor to war, was that the South German States would forsake the North and range their troops under the French eagles, as they had done in the years 1805-12.  The first plan of campaign drawn up at Paris aimed at driving a solid wedge of French troops between the two Confederations and inducing or compelling the South to join France; it was hoped that Saxony would follow.  As a matter of fact, very many of the South Germans and Saxons disliked Prussian supremacy; Catholic Bavaria looked askance at the growing power of Protestant Prussia.  Wuertemberg was Protestant, but far too democratic to wish for the control of the cast-iron bureaucrats