Outwardly, the French army appeared to be beyond the reach of criticism.  The troops had in large measure seen active service in the various wars whereby Napoleon III. fulfilled his promise of 1852—­“The Empire is peace”; and their successes in the Crimea, Lombardy, Syria, and China, everywhere in fact but Mexico, filled them with warlike pride.  Armed with the chassepot, a newer and better rifle than the needle-gun, while their artillery (admittedly rather weak) was strengthened by the mitrailleuse, they claimed to be the best in the world, and burned to measure swords with the upstart forces of Prussia.

[Illustration:  SKETCH MAP OF THE DISTRICT BETWEEN METZ AND THE RHINE.]

But there was a sombre reverse to this bright side.  All thinking Frenchmen, including the Emperor, were aware of grave defects—­the lack of training of the officers[36], and the want of adaptability in the General Staff, which had little of that practical knowledge that the German Staff secured by periods of service with the troops.  Add to this the leaven of republicanism working strongly in the army as in the State, and producing distrust between officers and men; above all, the lack of men and materials; and the outlook was not reassuring to those who knew the whole truth.  Inclusive of the levies of the year 1869, which were not quite ready for active service, France would have by August 1, 1870, as many as 567,000 men in her regular army; but of these colonial, garrison, and other duties claimed as many as 230,000—­a figure which seems designed to include the troops that existed only on paper.  Not only the personnel but the materiel came far below what was expected.  General Leboeuf, the War Minister, ventured to declare that all was ready even to the last button on the gaiters; but his boast at once rang false when at scores of military depots neither gaiters, boots, nor uniforms were ready for the reservists who needed them.

[Footnote 36:  M. de la Gorce in his Histoire du second Empire, vol. vi., tells how the French officers scouted study of the art of war, while most of them looked on favouritism as the only means of promotion.  The warnings of Colonel Stoffel, French Military Attache at Berlin, were passed over, as those of “a Prussomane, whom Bismarck had fascinated.”]

Even where the organisation worked at its best, that best was slow and confused.  There were no territorial army corps in time of peace; and the lack of this organisation led to a grievous waste of time and energy.  Regiments were frequently far away from the depots which contained the reservists’ equipment; and when these had found their equipment, they often wandered widely before finding their regiments on the way to the frontier.  One general officer hunted about on the frontier for a command which did not exist.  As a result of this lack of organisation, and of that control over the railways which the Germans had methodically enforced, France lost the many advantages which her compact territory and excellent railway system ought to have ensured over her more straggling and poorer rival.