his windows broken.  Late on that night Gramont set aside a last attempt of Lord Granville to offer the mediation of England in the cause of peace, on the ground that this would be to the harm of France—­“unless means were found to stop the rapid mobilisation of the Prussian armies which were approaching our frontier[32].”  In this connection it is needful to state that the order for mobilising the North German troops was not given by the King of Prussia until late on July 15, when the war votes of the French Chambers were known at Berlin.

[Footnote 32:  Quoted by Sorel, op. cit. vol. i. p. 196.]

Benedetti, in his review of the whole question, passes the following very noteworthy and sensible verdict:  “It was public opinion which forced the [French] Government to draw the sword, and by an irresistible onset dictated its resolutions[33].”  This is certainly true for the public opinion of Paris, though not of France as a whole.  The rural districts which form the real strength of France nearly always cling to peace.  It is significant that the Prefects of French Departments reported that only 16 declared in favour of war, while 37 were in doubt on the matter, and 34 accepted war with regret.  This is what might be expected from a people which in the Provinces is marked by prudence and thrift.

[Footnote 33:  Benedetti, Ma Mission en Prusse, p. 411.]

In truth, the people of modern Europe have settled down to a life of peaceful industry, in which war is the most hateful of evils.  On the other hand, the massing of mankind in great cities, where thought is superficial and feelings can quickly be stirred by a sensation-mongering Press, has undoubtedly helped to feed political passions and national hatred.  A rural population is not deeply stirred by stories of slights to ambassadors.  The peasant of Brittany had no active dislike for the peasant of Brandenburg.  Each only asked to be left to till his fields in peace and safety.  But the crowds on the Parisian boulevards and in Unter den Linden took (and seemingly always will take) a very different view of life.  To them the news of the humiliation of the rival beyond the Rhine was the greatest and therefore the most welcome of sensations; and, unfortunately, the papers which pandered to their habits set the tone of thought for no small part of France and Germany and exerted on national policy an influence out of all proportion to its real weight.

The story of the Franco-German dispute is one of national jealousy carefully fanned for four years by newspaper editors and popular speakers until a spark sufficed to set Western Europe in a blaze.  The spark was the Hohenzollern candidature, which would have fallen harmless had not the tinder been prepared since Koeniggratz by journalists at Paris and Berlin.  The resulting conflagration may justly be described as due partly to national friction and partly to the supposed interests of the Napoleonic dynasty, but also to the heat engendered by a sensational Press.