together a steamer, which had been brought up in sections, was stopped because an all-important nut had been lost in transit.  At once the Sirdar ordered horsemen to patrol the railway line—­and the nut was found.  At last the vessel was ready; but on her trial trip she burst a cylinder and had to be left behind[412].  Three small steamers and four gunboats were, however, available for service in the middle of September, when the expedition moved on.

[Footnote 412:  Ibid, p. 54.]

By this time the effective force numbered about 12,000 men.  The Dervishes had little heart for fighting to the north of Dongola; and even at that town the Dervishes made but a poor stand, cowed as they were by the shells of the steamers and perplexed by the enveloping moves which the Sirdar ordered; 700 were taken in Dongola, and the best 300 of these were incorporated in the Sirdar’s Sudanese regiments (Sept. 23, 1896).

Thus ended the first part of the expedition.  Events had justified Gordon’s statement that a small well-equipped expedition could speedily overthrow the Mahdi—­that is, in the days of his comparative weakness before the capture of Khartum.  The ease with which Dongola had been taken and the comparative cheapness of the expedition predisposed the Egyptian Government and the English public to view its extension southwards with less of disfavour.

Again the new stride forward had to be prepared for by careful preparations at the base.  The question of route also caused delay.  It proved to be desirable to begin a new railway from Wady Haifa across the desert to Abu Hamed at the northern tip of the deep bend which the Nile makes below Berber.  To drive a line into a desert in order to attack an enemy holding a good position beyond seemed a piece of fool-hardiness.  Nevertheless it was done, and at the average rate of about 1 1/4 miles a day.  In due course General Hunter pushed on and captured Abu Hamed, the inhabitants of which showed little fight, being thoroughly weary of Dervish tyranny (August 6, 1897).

The arrival of gunboats after a long struggle with the rapids below Abu Hamed gave Hunter’s little force a much-needed support; and before he could advance further, news reached him that the Dervishes had abandoned Berber.  This step caused general surprise, and it has never been fully explained.  Some have averred that a panic seized the wives of the Dervish garrison at Berber, and that when they rushed out of the town southwards their husbands followed them[413].  Certain it is that family feelings, which the Dervishes so readily outraged in others, played a leading part in many of their movements.  Whatever the cause may have been, the abandonment of Berber greatly facilitated the work of Sir Herbert Kitchener.  A strong force soon mustered at that town, and the route to the Red Sea was reopened by a friendly arrangement with the local sheikhs.

[Footnote 413:  The Downfall of the Dervishes, by E.N.  Bennett, M.A., p. 23.]