Earl Granville summed up his statement of the case in the words:—­

The Mission of General Gordon, as originally designed and decided upon, was of a pacific nature and in no way involved any movement of British forces. . . .  He was, in addition, authorised and instructed to perform such other duties as the Egyptian Government might desire to entrust to him and as might be communicated by you to him. . . .  Her Majesty’s Government, bearing in mind the exigencies of the occasion, concurred in these instructions [those of the Egyptian Government], which virtually altered General Gordon’s Mission from one of advice to that of executing, or at least directing, the evacuation not only of Khartum but of the whole Sudan, and they were willing that General Gordon should receive the very extended powers conferred upon him by the Khedive to enable him to effect his difficult task.  But they have throughout joined in your anxiety that he should not expose himself to unnecessary personal risk, or place himself in a position from which retreat would be difficult[397].

[Footnote 397:  Egypt, No. 13 (1884), pp. 5, 6.  Earl Granville made the same statement in his despatch of April 23.  See, too, The Life of Lord Granville.]

He then states that it is clear that Khartum can hold out for at least six months, if it is attacked, and, seeing that the British occupation of Egypt was only “for a special and temporary purpose,” any expedition into the Sudan would be highly undesirable on general as well as diplomatic grounds.

Both of these views of duty are intelligible as well as creditable to those who held them.  But the former view is that of a high-souled officer; the latter, that of a responsible and much-tried Minister and diplomatist.  They were wholly divergent, and divergence there spelt disaster.

On hearing of the siege of Khartum, General Stephenson, then commanding the British forces in Egypt, advised the immediate despatch of a brigade to Dongola—­a step which would probably have produced the best results; but that advice was overruled at London for the reasons stated above.  Ministers seem to have feared that Gordon might use the force for offensive purposes.  An Egyptian battalion was sent up the Nile to Korosko in the middle of May; but the “moral effect” hoped for from that daring step vanished in face of a serious reverse.  On May 19, the important city of Berber was taken by the Mahdists[398].

[Footnote 398:  Parl.  Papers, Egypt, No. 25 (1884), pp. 129-131.]

Difficult as the removal of about 10,000 to 15,000[399] Egyptians from Khartum had always been—­and there were fifteen other garrisons to be rescued—­it was now next to impossible, unless some blow were dealt at the rebels in that neighbourhood.  The only effective blow would be that dealt by British or Indian troops, and this the Government refused, though Gordon again and again pointed out that a small well-equipped