Nevertheless, it is regrettable that Ministers took up on the Sudan problem a position that was logically sound but futile in the sphere of action.  Gordon’s mission, according to Earl Granville, was a peaceful one, and he inquired anxiously what progress had been made in the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons and civilians.  This question he put, even in the teeth of Gordon’s positive statement in a telegram of March 8:—­

If you do not send Zebehr, you have no chance of getting the garrisons away; . . .  Zebehr here would be far more powerful than the Mahdi, and he would make short work of the Mahdi[394].

[Footnote 394:  Ibid. p. 145.]

A week earlier Gordon had closed a telegram with the despairing words:—­

I will do my best to carry out my instructions, but I feel conviction I shall be caught in Khartum[395].

[Footnote 395:  Ibid. p. 152.]

It is not surprising that Ministers were perplexed by Gordon’s despatches, or that Baring telegraphed to Khartum that he found it very difficult to understand what the General wanted.  All who now peruse his despatches must have the same feeling, mixed with one of regret that he ever weakened his case by the proposal to “smash the Mahdi.”  Thenceforth the British Government obviously felt some distrust of their envoy; and in this disturbing factor, and the duality of Gordon’s duties, we may discern one cause at least of the final disaster.

On March 11, the British Government refused either to allow the appointment of Zebehr, or to send British or Indian troops from Suakim to Berber.  Without wishing to force Gordon’s hand prematurely, Earl Granville urged the need of evacuation at as early a date as might be practicable.  On March 16, after hearing ominous news as to the spread of the Mahdi’s power near to Khartum and Berber, he advised the evacuation of the former city at the earliest possible date[396].  We may here note that the rebels began to close round it on March 18.

[Footnote 396:  Ibid. pp. 158, 162, 166.]

Earl Granville’s advice directly conflicted with Gordon’s sense of honour.  As he stated, on or about March 20, the fidelity of the people of Khartum, while treachery was rife all around, bound him not to leave them until he could do so “under a Government which would give them some hope of peace.”  Here again his duty as Governor of the Sudan, or his extreme conscientiousness as a man, held him to his post despite the express recommendations of the British Government.  His decision is ever to be regretted; but it redounds to his honour as a Christian and a soldier.  At bottom, the misunderstanding between him and the Cabinet rested on a divergent view of duty.  Gordon summed up his scruples in his telegram to Baring:—­

You must see that you could not recall me, nor could I possibly obey, until the Cairo employes get out from all the places.  I have named men to different places, thus involving them with the Mahdi.  How could I look the world in the face if I abandoned them and fled?  As a gentleman, could you advise this course?