[Footnote 391:  For details of these battles, see Sir F. Wingate’s Mahdism, chap, iii., and Life of Sir Gerald Graham (1901).]

The first hint of any change of policy was made by Gordon in his despatch of Feb. 26, to Sir E. Baring.  After stating his regret at the refusal of the British Government to allow the despatch of Zebehr as his successor, he used these remarkable words:—­

You must remember that when evacuation is carried out, Mahdi will come down here, and, by agents, will not let Egypt be quiet.  Of course my duty is evacuation, and the best I can for establishing a quiet government.  The first I hope to accomplish.  The second is a more difficult task, and concerns Egypt more than me.  If Egypt is to be quiet, Mahdi must be smashed up.  Mahdi is most unpopular, and with care and time could be smashed.  Remember that once Khartum belongs to Mahdi, the task will be far more difficult; yet you will, for safety of Egypt, execute it.  If you decide on smashing Mahdi, then send up another L100,000 and send up 200 Indian troops to Wady Haifa, and send officer up to Dongola under pretence to look out quarters for troops.  Leave Suakim and Massowah alone.  I repeat that evacuation is possible, but you will feel effect in Egypt, and will be forced to enter into a far more serious affair in order to guard Egypt.  At present, it would be comparatively easy to destroy Mahdi[392].

[Footnote 392:  Egypt, No. 12 (1884), p. 115.]

This statement arouses different opinions according to the point of view from which we regard it.  As a declaration of general policy it is no less sound than prophetic; as a despatch from the Governor-General of the Sudan to the Egyptian Government, it claimed serious attention; as a recommendation sent by a British officer to the Home Government, it was altogether beyond his powers.  Gordon was sent out for a distinct aim; he now proposed to subordinate that aim to another far vaster aim which lay beyond his province.  Nevertheless, Sir E. Baring on February 28, and on March 4, urged the Gladstone Ministry even now to accede to Gordon’s request for Zebehr Pasha as his successor, on the ground that some Government must be left in the Sudan, and Zebehr was deemed at Cairo to be the only possible governor.  Again the Home Government refused, and thereby laid themselves under the moral obligation of suggesting an alternate course.  The only course suggested was to allow the despatch of a British force up the Nile, if occasion seemed to demand it[393].

[Footnote 393:  Egypt, No. 12 (1884) p. 119.]

In this connection it is well to remember that the question of Egypt and the Sudan was only one of many that distracted the attention of Ministers.  The events outside Suakim alone might give them pause before they plunged into the Sudan; for that was the time when Russia was moving on towards Afghanistan; and the agreement between the three Emperors imposed the need of caution on a State as isolated and unpopular as England then was.  In view of the designs of the German colonial party (see Chapter XVII.) and the pressure of the Irish problem, the Gladstone Cabinet was surely justified in refusing to undertake any new responsibilities, except on the most urgent need.  Vital interests were at stake in too many places to warrant a policy of Quixotic adventure up the Nile.