The first sharp collision between Gordon and the Home Government resulted from his urgent request for the employment of Zebehr Pasha as the future ruler of the Sudan.  A native of the Sudan, this man had risen to great wealth and power by his energy and ambition, and figured as a kind of king among the slave-raiders of the Upper Nile, until, for some offence against the Egyptian Government, he was interned at Cairo.  At that city Gordon had a conference with Zebehr in the presence of Sir E. Baring, Nubar Pasha, and others.  It was long and stormy, and gave the impression of undying hatred felt by the slaver for the slave-liberator.  This alone seemed to justify the Gladstone Ministry in refusing Gordon’s request[387].  Had Zebehr gone with Gordon, he would certainly have betrayed him—­so thought Sir Evelyn Baring.

[Footnote 387:  Ibid. pp. 38-41.]

Setting out from Cairo and travelling quickly up the Nile, Gordon reached Khartum on February 18, and received an enthusiastic welcome from the discouraged populace.  At once he publicly burned all instruments of torture and records of old debts; so that his popularity overshadowed that of the Mahdi.  Again he urged the despatch of Zebehr as his “successor,” after the withdrawal of troops and civilians from the Sudan.  But, as Sir Evelyn Baring said in forwarding Gordon’s request to Downing Street, it would be most dangerous to place them together at Khartum.  It should further be noted that Gordon’s telegrams showed his belief that the Mahdi’s power was overrated, and that his advance in person on Khartum was most unlikely[388].  It is not surprising, then, that Lord Granville telegraphed to Sir E. Baring on February 22 that the public opinion of England “would not tolerate the appointment of Zebehr Pasha[389].”  Already it had been offended by Gordon’s proclamation at Khartum that the Government would not interfere with the buying and selling of slaves, though, as Sir Evelyn Baring pointed out, the re-establishment of slavery resulted quite naturally from the policy of evacuation; and he now strongly urged that Gordon should have “full liberty of action to complete the execution of his general plans[390].”

[Footnote 388:  Egypt, No. 12 (1884), pp. 74, 82, 88.]

[Footnote 389:  Ibid. p. 95.]

[Footnote 390:  Ibid. p. 94.]

Here it is desirable to remember that the Mahdist movement was then confined almost entirely to three chief districts—­Kordofan, parts of the lands adjoining the Blue Nile, and the tribes dwelling west and south-west of Suakim.  For the present these last were the most dangerous.  Already they had overpowered and slaughtered two Egyptian forces; and on February 22 news reached Cairo of the fall of Tokar before the valiant swordsmen of Osman Digna.  But this was far away from the Nile and did not endanger Gordon.  British troops were landed at Suakim for the protection of that port, but this step implied no change of policy respecting the Sudan.  The slight impression which two brilliant but costly victories, those of El Teb and Tamai, made on the warlike tribes at the back of Suakim certainly showed the need of caution in pushing a force into the Sudan when the fierce heats of summer were coming on[391].