[Footnote 373:  It is said, however, that Arabi had warned M. de Lesseps that “the defence of Egypt requires the temporary destruction of the Canal” (Traill, England, Egypt, and the Sudan, p. 57).  The status of the Canal was defined in 1885. Ibid. p. 59.]

The annoyance of France was more natural.  She had made the Suez Canal, and had participated in the Dual Control; but her mistake in not sharing in the work of restoring order was irreparable.  Every one in Egypt saw that the control of that country must rest with the Power which had swept away Arabi’s Government and re-established the fallen authority of the Khedive.  A few persons in England, even including one member of the Gladstone Administration, Mr. Courtney, urged a speedy withdrawal; but the Cabinet, which had been unwillingly but irresistibly drawn thus far by the force of circumstances, could not leave Egypt a prey to anarchy; and, clearly, the hand that repressed anarchy ruled the country for the time being.  It is significant that on April 4, 1883, more than 2600 Europeans in Egypt presented a petition begging that the British occupation might be permanent[374].

[Footnote 374:  Sir A. Milner, England in Egypt, p. 31.]

Mr. Gladstone, however, and others of his Cabinet, had declared that it would be only temporary, and would, in fact, last only so long as to enable order and prosperity to grow up under the shadow of new and better institutions.  These pledges were given with all sincerity, and the Prime Minister and his colleagues evidently wished to be relieved from what was to them a disagreeable burden.  The French in Egypt, of course, fastened on these promises, and one of their newspapers, the Journal Egyptien, printed them every day at the head of its front columns[375].  Mr. Gladstone, who sought above all things for a friendly understanding with France, keenly felt, even to the end of his career, that the continued occupation of Egypt hindered that most desirable consummation.  He was undoubtedly right.  The irregularity of England’s action in Egypt hampered her international relations at many points; and it may be assigned as one of the causes that brought France into alliance with Russia.

[Footnote 375:  H.F.  Wood, Egypt under the British, p. 59 (1896).]

What, then, hindered the fulfilment of Mr. Gladstone’s pledges?  In the first place, the dog-in-the-manger policy of French officials and publicists increased the difficulties of the British administrators who now, in the character of advisers of the Khedive, really guided him and controlled his Ministers.  The scheme of administration adopted was in the main that advised by Lord Dufferin in his capacity of Special Envoy.  The details, however, are too wide and complex to be set forth here.  So also are those of the disputes between our officials and those of France.  Suffice it to say that by shutting up the funds of the “Caisse de la Dette,” the French administrators of that great reserve fund hoped to make Britain’s position untenable and hasten her evacuation.  In point of fact, these and countless other pin-pricks delayed Egypt’s recovery and furnished a good reason why Britain should not withdraw[376].