[Illustration:  BATTLE OF ALEXANDRIA (BOMBARDMENT OF, 1882).]

Had Admiral Seymour at once landed a force of marines and bluejackets, all the forts would probably have been surrendered at once.  For some reason not fully known, this was not done.  Spasmodic firing began again in the morning, but a truce was before long arranged, which proved to be only a device for enabling Arabi and his troops to escape.  The city, meanwhile, was the scene of a furious outbreak against Europeans, in which some 400 or 500 persons perished.  Damage, afterwards assessed at L7,000,000, was done by fire and pillage.  It was not till the 14th that the admiral, after receiving reinforcements, felt able to send troops into the city, when a few severe examples cowed the plunderers and restored order.  The Khedive, who had shut himself up in his palace at Ramleh, now came back to the seaport under the escort of a British force, and thenceforth remained virtually, though not in name, under British protection.

The bombardment of Alexandria brought about the resignation of that sturdy Quaker, and friend of peace, Mr. John Bright from the Gladstone Ministry; but everything tends to show (as even M. de Freycinet admits) that the crisis took Ministers by surprise.  Nothing was ready at home for an important campaign; and it would seem that hostilities resulted, firstly, from the violence of Arabi’s supporters in Alexandria, and, secondly, from their persistence in warlike preparations which might have endangered the safety of Admiral Seymour’s fleet.  The situation was becoming like that of 1807 at the Dardanelles, when the Turks gave smooth promises to Admiral Duckworth, all the time strengthening their forts, with very disagreeable results.  Probably the analogy of 1807, together with the proven perfidy of Arabi’s men, brought on hostilities, which the British Ministers up to the end were anxious to avoid.

In any case, the die was now cast, and England entered questioningly on a task, the magnitude and difficulty of which no one could then foresee.  She entered on it alone, and that, too, though the Gladstone Ministry had made pressing overtures for the help of France, at any rate as regarded the protection of the Suez Canal.  To this extent, de Freycinet and his colleagues were prepared to lend their assistance; but, despite Gambetta’s urgent appeal for common action with England at that point, the Chamber of Deputies still remained in a cautiously negative mood, and to that frame of mind M. Clemenceau added strength by a speech ending with a glorification of prudence.  “Europe,” he said, “is covered with soldiers; every one is in a state of expectation; all the Power are reserving their future liberty of action; do you reserve the liberty of action of France.”  The restricted co-operation with England which the Cabinet recommended found favour with only seventy-five deputies; and, when face to face with a large hostile majority, de Freycinet and his colleagues resigned (July 29, 1882)[368].  Prudence, fear of the newly-formed Triple Alliance, or jealousy of England, drew France aside from the path to which her greatest captains, thinkers, and engineers had beckoned her in time past.  Whatever the predominant motive may have been, it altered the course of history in the valley of the Nile.