Even this clear warning was lost on Arabi and his following.  Believing that Britain was too weak, and her Ministry too vacillating, to make good these threats, they proceeded to arm the populace and strengthen the forts of Alexandria.  Sir Beauchamp Seymour, now at the head of a strong squadron, reported to London that these works were going on in a threatening manner, and on July 6 sent a demand to Arabi that the operations should cease at once.  To this Arabi at once acceded.  Nevertheless, the searchlight, when suddenly turned on, showed that work was going on at night.  A report of an Egyptian officer was afterwards found in one of the forts, in which he complained of the use of the electric light by the English as distinctly discourteous.  It may here be noted that M. de Freycinet, in his jaundiced survey of British action at this time, seeks to throw doubt on the resumption of work by Arabi’s men.  But Admiral Seymour’s reports leave no loophole for doubt.  Finally, on July 10, the admiral demanded, not only the cessation of hostile preparations, but the surrender of some of the forts into British hands.  The French fleet now left the harbour and steamed for Port Said.  Most of the Europeans of Alexandria had withdrawn to ships provided for them; and on the morrow, when the last of the twenty-four hours of grace brought no submission, the British fleet opened fire at 7 A.M.

The ensuing action is of great interest as being one of the very few cases in modern warfare where ships have successfully encountered modern forts.  The seeming helplessness of the British unarmoured ships before Cronstadt during the Crimean War, their failure before the forts of Sevastopol, and the uselessness of the French navy during the war of 1870, had spread the notion that warships could not overpower modern fortifications.  Probably this impression lay at the root of Arabi’s defiance.  He had some grounds for confidence.  The British fleet consisted of eight battleships (of which only the Inflexible and Alexandra were of great fighting power), along with five unarmoured vessels.  The forts mounted 33 rifled muzzle-loading guns, 3 rifled breech-loaders, and 120 old smooth-bores.  The advantage in gun-power lay with the ships, especially as the sailors were by far the better marksmen.  Yet so great is the superiority of forts over ships that the engagement lasted five hours or more (7 A.M. till noon) before most of the forts were silenced more or less completely.  Fort Pharos continued to fire till 4 P.M.  On the whole, the Egyptian gunners stood manfully to their guns.  Considering the weight of metal thrown against the forts, namely, 1741 heavy projectiles and 1457 light, the damage done to them was not great, only 27 cannon being silenced completely, and 5 temporarily.  On the other hand, the ships were hit only 75 times and lost only 6 killed and 27 wounded.  The results show that the comparatively distant cannonades of to-day, even with great guns, are far less deadly than the old sea-fights when ships were locked yard-arm to yard-arm.