and a Maltese led to a fierce rising.  The “true believers” attacked the houses of the Europeans, secured a great quantity of loot, and killed about fifty of them, including men from the British squadron.  The English party that always calls out for non-intervention made vigorous efforts at that time, and subsequently, to represent this riot and massacre as a mere passing event which did not seriously compromise the welfare of Egypt; but Sir Alfred Milner in his calm and judicial survey of the whole question states that the fears then entertained by Europeans in Egypt “so far from being exaggerated, . . . perhaps even fell short of the danger which was actually impending[365].”

[Footnote 365:  England in Egypt, p. 16.  For details of the massacre and its preconcerted character, sec Parl.  Papers, Egypt, No. 4 (1884).]

The events at Alexandria and Tantah made armed intervention inevitable.  Nothing could be hoped for from Turkey.  The Sultan’s special envoy, Dervish Pasha, had arrived in Egypt only a few days before the outbreak; and after that occurrence Abdul Hamid thought fit to send a decoration to Arabi.  Encouraged by the support of Turkey and by the well-known jealousies of the Powers, the military party now openly prepared to defy Europe.  They had some grounds for hope.  Every one knew that France was in a very cautious mood, having enough on her hands in Tunis and Algeria, while her relations to England had rapidly cooled[366].  Germany, Russia, and Austria seemed to be acting together according to an understanding arrived at by the three Emperors after their meeting at Danzig in 1881; and Germany had begun that work of favouring the Sultan which enabled her to supplant British influence at Constantinople.  Accordingly, few persons, least of all Arabi, believed that the Gladstone Cabinet would dare to act alone and strike a decisive blow.  But they counted wrongly.  Gladstone’s toleration in regard to foreign affairs was large-hearted, but it had its limits.  He now declared in Parliament that Arabi had thrown off the mask and was evidently working to depose the Khedive and oust all Europeans from Egypt; England would intervene to prevent this—­if possible with the authority of Europe, with the support of France, and the co-operation of Turkey; but, if necessary, alone[367].

[Footnote 366:  For the reasons of de Freycinet’s caution, see his work, ch. iii., especially pp. 236 et seq.]

[Footnote 367:  See, too, Gladstone’s speech of July 25, 1882, in which he asserted that there was not a shred of evidence to support Arabi’s claim to be the leader of a national party; also, his letter of July 14 to John Bright, quoted by Mr. Morley, Life of Gladstone, vol. iii. pp. 84-85.  Probably Gladstone was misinformed.]