That year saw the institution of the “Caisse de la Dette,” with power to receive the revenue set aside for the service of the debt, and to sanction or forbid new loans; and in the month of November 1876 the commission of bondholders took the form of the “Dual Control.”  In 1878 a Commission was appointed with power to examine the whole of the Egyptian administration.  It met with the strongest opposition from the Khedive, until in the next year means were found to bring about his abdication by the act of the Sultan (June 26, 1879).  His successor was his son Tewfik (1879-92).

On their side the bondholders had to submit to a reduction of rates of interest to a uniform rate of 4 per cent on the Unified Debt.  Even so, it was found in the year 1881—­a prosperous year—­that about half of the Egyptian revenue, then L9,229,000, had to be diverted to the payment of that interest[359].  Again, one must remark that such a situation in an overtaxed country would naturally end in bankruptcy; but this was prevented by foreign control, which sought to cut down expenditure in all directions.  As a natural result, many industries suffered from the lack of due support; for even in the silt-beds formed by the Nile (and they are the real Egypt) there is need of capital to bring about due results.  In brief, the popular discontent gave strength to a movement which aimed at ousting foreign influences of every kind, not only the usurers and stock-jobbers that sucked the life-blood of the land, but even the engineers and bankers who quickened its sluggish circulation.  This movement was styled a national movement; and its abettors raised that cry of “Egypt for Egyptians,” which has had its counterpart wherever selfish patriots seek to keep all the good things of the land to themselves.  The Egyptian troubles of the year 1882 originated partly in feelings of this narrow kind, and partly in the jealousies and strifes of military cliques.

[Footnote 359:  England in Egypt, etc. p. 222.  See there for details as to the Dual Control; also de Freycinet, op. cit. chap. ii., and The Expansion of Egypt, by A. Silva White, chap. vi.]

Sir D. Mackenzie Wallace, after carefully investigating the origin of the “Arabi movement,” came to the conclusion that it was to be found in the determination of the native Egyptian officers to force their way to the higher grades of that army, hitherto reserved for Turks or Circassians.  Said and Ismail had favoured the rise of the best soldiers of the fellahin class (that is, natives), and several of them, on becoming colonels, aimed at yet higher posts.  This aroused bitter resentment in the dominant Turkish caste, which looked on the fellahin as born to pay taxes and bear burdens.  Under the masterful Ismail these jealousies were hidden; but the young and inexperienced Tewfik, the nominee of the rival Western Powers, was unable to bridle the restless spirits of the army, who looked around them for means to strengthen their position at the expense of their rivals.  These jealousies were inflamed by the youthful caprice of Tewfik.  At first he extended great favour to Ali Fehmi, an officer of fellah descent, only to withdraw it owing to the intrigues of a Circassian rival.  Ali Fehmi sought for revenge by forming a cabal with other fellah colonels, among whom a popular leader soon came to the front.  This was Arabi Bey.