The facts of history, it should be noted, lent support to this contention of “the great Frenchman.”  The idea of the canal had originated with Napoleon I., and it was revived with much energy by the followers of the French philosopher, St. Simon, in the years 1833-37[358].  The project, however, then encountered the opposition of British statesmen, as it did from the days of Pitt to those of Palmerston.  This was not unnatural; for it promised to bring back to the ports of the Mediterranean the preponderant share in the eastern trade which they had enjoyed before the discovery of the route by the Cape of Good Hope.  The political and commercial interests of England were bound up with the sea route, especially after the Cape was definitively assigned to her by the Peace of Paris of 1814; but she could not see with indifference the control by France of a canal which would divert trade once more to the old overland route.  That danger was now averted by the financial coup just noticed—­an affair which may prove to have been scarcely less important in a political sense than Nelson’s victory at the Nile.

[Footnote 358:  La Question d’Egypte, by C. de Freycinet, p. 106.]

In truth, the Sea Power has made up for her defects of position as regards Egypt by four great strokes—­the triumph of her great admiral, the purchase of Ismail’s canal shares, the repression of Arabi’s revolt, and Lord Kitchener’s victory at Omdurman.  The present writer has not refrained from sharp criticism on British policy in the period 1870-1900; and the Egyptian policy of the Cabinets of Queen Victoria has been at times open to grave censure; but, on the whole, it has come out well, thanks to the ability of individuals to supply the qualities of foresight, initiative, and unswerving persistence, in which Ministers since the time of Chatham have rarely excelled.

The sale of Ismail’s canal shares only served to stave off the impending crash which would have formed the natural sequel to this new “South Sea Bubble.”  All who took part in this carnival of folly ought to have suffered alike, Ismail and his beys along with the stock-jobbers and dividend-hunters of London and Paris.  In an ordinary case these last would have lost their money; but in this instance the borrower was weak and dependent, while the lenders were in a position to stir up two powerful Governments to action.  Nearly the whole of the Egyptian loans was held in England and France; and in 1876, when Ismail was floating swiftly down stream to the abyss of bankruptcy, the British and French bondholders cast about them for means to secure their own safety.  They organised themselves for the protection of their interests.  The Khedive consented to hear the advice of their representatives, Messrs. Goschen and Joubert; but it was soon clear that he desired merely a comfortable liquidation and the continuance of his present expenditure.