The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1914 (5th ed.) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 780 pages of information about The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1914 (5th ed.).

The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1914 (5th ed.) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 780 pages of information about The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1914 (5th ed.).

If the French Government had really wished for peace, it would have let the matter end there.  But it did not do so.  The extreme Bonapartists—­plus royalistes que le roi—­all along wished to gain prestige for their sovereign by inflicting an open humiliation on King William and through him on Prussia.  They were angry that he had evaded the snare, and now brought pressure to bear on the Ministry, especially the Duc de Gramont, so that at 7 P.M. of that same day (July 12) he sent a telegram to Benedetti at Ems directing him to see King William and press him to declare that he “would not again authorise this candidature.”  The Minister added:  “The effervescence of spirits [at Paris] is such that we do not know whether we shall succeed in mastering it.”  This was true.  Paris was almost beside herself.  As M. Sorel says:  “The warm July evening drove into the streets a populace greedy of shows and excitements, whose imagination was spoiled by the custom of political quackery, for whom war was but a drama and history a romance[28].”  Such was the impulse which led to Gramont’s new demand, and it was made in spite of the remonstrances of the British ambassador, Lord Lyons.

[Footnote 28:  Sorel, Hist. diplomatique de la Guerre Franco-Allemande, vol. i. chap. iv.; also for the tone of the French Press, Giraudeau, La Verite sur la Campagne de 1870, pp. 46-60.

Ollivier tried to persuade Sir M.E.  Grant Duff (Notes from a Diary, 1873-1881, vol. i. p. 45) that the French demand to King William was quite friendly and natural.]

Viewing that demand in the clearer light of the present time, we must say that it was not unreasonable in itself; but it was presented in so insistent a way that King William declined to entertain it.  Again Gramont pressed Benedetti to urge the matter; but the utmost that the King would do was to state:  “He gives his approbation entirely and without reserve to the withdrawal of the Prince of Hohenzollern:  he cannot do more.”  He refused to see the ambassador further on this subject; but on setting out to return to Berlin—­a step necessitated by the growing excitement throughout Germany—­he took leave of Benedetti with perfect cordiality (July 14).  The ambassador thereupon returned to Paris.

Meanwhile, however, Bismarck had given the last flick to the restive courses of the Press on both sides of the Rhine.  In his Reminiscences he has described his depression of spirits on hearing the news of the withdrawal of Prince Leopold’s candidature and of his nearly formed resolve to resign as a protest against so tame a retreat before French demands.  But while Moltke, Roon, and he were dining together, a telegram reached him from the King at Ems, dated July 13, 3.50 P.M., which gave him leave to inform the ambassadors and the Press of the present state of affairs.  Bismarck saw his chance.  The telegram could be cut down so as to give a more resolute look to the whole affair.  And, after gaining Moltke’s assurance that everything was ready for war, he proceeded to condense it.  The facts here can only be understood by a comparison of the two versions.  We therefore give the original as sent to Bismarck by Abeken, Secretary to the Foreign Office, who was then at Ems:—­

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The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1914 (5th ed.) from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.